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10 vulnerabilities found for edge_virtualization_engine by linuxfoundation
CVE-2023-43632 (GCVE-0-2023-43632)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2023-09-21 13:13 – Updated: 2024-09-24 17:09
VLAI?
Title
Freely Allocate Buffer on The Stack With Data From Socket
Summary
As noted in the “VTPM.md” file in the eve documentation, “VTPM is a server listening on port
8877 in EVE, exposing limited functionality of the TPM to the clients.
VTPM allows clients to
execute tpm2-tools binaries from a list of hardcoded options”
The communication with this server is done using protobuf, and the data is comprised of 2
parts:
1. Header
2. Data
When a connection is made, the server is waiting for 4 bytes of data, which will be the header,
and these 4 bytes would be parsed as uint32 size of the actual data to come.
Then, in the function “handleRequest” this size is then used in order to allocate a payload on
the stack for the incoming data.
As this payload is allocated on the stack, this will allow overflowing the stack size allocated for
the relevant process with freely controlled data.
* An attacker can crash the system.
* An attacker can gain control over the system, specifically on the “vtpm_server” process
which has very high privileges.
Severity ?
9 (Critical)
CWE
- CWE-789 - Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LF-Edge, Zededa | EVE OS |
Affected:
3.0.0 , < 9.5.0
(release)
|
Credits
Ilay Levi
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CVE-2023-43631 (GCVE-0-2023-43631)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2023-09-21 13:17 – Updated: 2024-09-24 17:41
VLAI?
Title
SSH as Root Unlockable Without Triggering Measured Boot
Summary
On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of
“/config/authorized_keys”.
If the file is present, and contains a supported public key, the container will go on to open
port 22 and enable sshd with the given keys as the authorized keys for root login.
An attacker could easily add their own keys and gain full control over the system without
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking
the device as “UUD” (“Unknown Update Detected”).
This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable, and
it is not encrypted in any way.
An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.
Note:
This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:
• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141
• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.
This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot.
Severity ?
8.8 (High)
CWE
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LF-Edge, Zededa | EVE OS |
Affected:
0 , < 8.6.0
(release)
Affected: 9.0.0 , < 9.5.0 (release) |
Credits
Ilay Levi
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CVE-2023-43636 (GCVE-0-2023-43636)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2023-09-20 14:50 – Updated: 2024-09-24 18:32
VLAI?
Title
Rootfs Not Protected
Summary
In EVE OS, the “measured boot” mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing
the encrypted data located in the vault.
As per the “measured boot” design, the PCR values calculated at different stages of the boot
process will change if any of their respective parts are changed.
This includes, among other things, the configuration of the bios, grub, the kernel cmdline,
initrd, and more.
However, this mechanism does not validate the entire rootfs, so an attacker can edit the
filesystem and gain control over the system.
As the default filesystem used by EVE OS is squashfs, this is somewhat harder than an ext4,
which is easily changeable.
This will not stop an attacker, as an attacker can repackage the squashfs with their changes
in it and replace the partition altogether.
This can also be done directly on the device, as the “003-storage-init” container contains the
“mksquashfs” and “unsquashfs” binaries (with the corresponding libs).
An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.
Note:
This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:
• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141
• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.
This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot.
Severity ?
8.8 (High)
CWE
- CWE-345 - Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LF-Edge, Zededa | EVE OS |
Affected:
9.0.0 , < 9.5.0
(release)
Affected: 0 , < 8.6.0 (release) |
Credits
Ilay Levi
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CVE-2023-43635 (GCVE-0-2023-43635)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2023-09-20 14:58 – Updated: 2024-09-25 14:37
VLAI?
Title
Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs
Summary
Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs
The measured boot solution implemented in EVE OS leans on a PCR locking mechanism.
Different parts of the system update different PCR values in the TPM, resulting in a unique
value for each PCR entry.
These PCRs are then used in order to seal/unseal a key from the TPM which is used to
encrypt/decrypt the “vault” directory.
This “vault” directory is the most sensitive point in the system and as such, its content should
be protected.
This mechanism is noted in Zededa’s documentation as the “measured boot” mechanism,
designed to protect said “vault”.
The code that’s responsible for generating and fetching the key from the TPM assumes that
SHA256 PCRs are used in order to seal/unseal the key, and as such their presence is being
checked.
The issue here is that the key is not sealed using SHA256 PCRs, but using SHA1 PCRs.
This leads to several issues:
• Machines that have their SHA256 PCRs enabled but SHA1 PCRs disabled, as well
as not sealing their keys at all, meaning the “vault” is not protected from an attacker.
• SHA1 is considered insecure and reduces the complexity level required to unseal the
key in machines which have their SHA1 PCRs enabled.
An attacker can very easily retrieve the contents of the “vault”, which will effectively render
the “measured boot” mechanism meaningless.
Severity ?
8.8 (High)
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LF-Edge, Zededa | EVE OS |
Affected:
0 , < 9.5.0
(release)
|
Credits
Ilay Levi
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CVE-2023-43630 (GCVE-0-2023-43630)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2023-09-20 14:37 – Updated: 2024-09-24 18:34
VLAI?
Title
Config Partition Not Measured From 2 Fronts
Summary
PCR14 is not in the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the “vault” key, but
due to the change that was implemented in commit
“7638364bc0acf8b5c481b5ce5fea11ad44ad7fd4”, fixing this issue alone would not solve the
problem of the config partition not being measured correctly.
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SHA256.
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“7638364bc0acf8b5c481b5ce5fea11ad44ad7fd4”, this is no longer the case for PCR14, as
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means that even if PCR14 were to be added to the list of PCRs sealing/unsealing the “vault”
key, changes to the config partition would still not be measured.
An attacker could modify the config partition without triggering the measured boot, this could
result in the attacker gaining full control over the device with full access to the contents of the
encrypted “vault”
Severity ?
8.8 (High)
CWE
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LF-Edge, Zededa | EVE OS |
Affected:
9.0.0 , < 9.5.0
(release)
|
Credits
Ilay Levi
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CVE-2023-43631 (GCVE-0-2023-43631)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2023-09-21 13:17 – Updated: 2024-09-24 17:41
VLAI?
Title
SSH as Root Unlockable Without Triggering Measured Boot
Summary
On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of
“/config/authorized_keys”.
If the file is present, and contains a supported public key, the container will go on to open
port 22 and enable sshd with the given keys as the authorized keys for root login.
An attacker could easily add their own keys and gain full control over the system without
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking
the device as “UUD” (“Unknown Update Detected”).
This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable, and
it is not encrypted in any way.
An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.
Note:
This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:
• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141
• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.
This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot.
Severity ?
8.8 (High)
CWE
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LF-Edge, Zededa | EVE OS |
Affected:
0 , < 8.6.0
(release)
Affected: 9.0.0 , < 9.5.0 (release) |
Credits
Ilay Levi
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CVE-2023-43632 (GCVE-0-2023-43632)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2023-09-21 13:13 – Updated: 2024-09-24 17:09
VLAI?
Title
Freely Allocate Buffer on The Stack With Data From Socket
Summary
As noted in the “VTPM.md” file in the eve documentation, “VTPM is a server listening on port
8877 in EVE, exposing limited functionality of the TPM to the clients.
VTPM allows clients to
execute tpm2-tools binaries from a list of hardcoded options”
The communication with this server is done using protobuf, and the data is comprised of 2
parts:
1. Header
2. Data
When a connection is made, the server is waiting for 4 bytes of data, which will be the header,
and these 4 bytes would be parsed as uint32 size of the actual data to come.
Then, in the function “handleRequest” this size is then used in order to allocate a payload on
the stack for the incoming data.
As this payload is allocated on the stack, this will allow overflowing the stack size allocated for
the relevant process with freely controlled data.
* An attacker can crash the system.
* An attacker can gain control over the system, specifically on the “vtpm_server” process
which has very high privileges.
Severity ?
9 (Critical)
CWE
- CWE-789 - Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LF-Edge, Zededa | EVE OS |
Affected:
3.0.0 , < 9.5.0
(release)
|
Credits
Ilay Levi
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CVE-2023-43635 (GCVE-0-2023-43635)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2023-09-20 14:58 – Updated: 2024-09-25 14:37
VLAI?
Title
Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs
Summary
Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs
The measured boot solution implemented in EVE OS leans on a PCR locking mechanism.
Different parts of the system update different PCR values in the TPM, resulting in a unique
value for each PCR entry.
These PCRs are then used in order to seal/unseal a key from the TPM which is used to
encrypt/decrypt the “vault” directory.
This “vault” directory is the most sensitive point in the system and as such, its content should
be protected.
This mechanism is noted in Zededa’s documentation as the “measured boot” mechanism,
designed to protect said “vault”.
The code that’s responsible for generating and fetching the key from the TPM assumes that
SHA256 PCRs are used in order to seal/unseal the key, and as such their presence is being
checked.
The issue here is that the key is not sealed using SHA256 PCRs, but using SHA1 PCRs.
This leads to several issues:
• Machines that have their SHA256 PCRs enabled but SHA1 PCRs disabled, as well
as not sealing their keys at all, meaning the “vault” is not protected from an attacker.
• SHA1 is considered insecure and reduces the complexity level required to unseal the
key in machines which have their SHA1 PCRs enabled.
An attacker can very easily retrieve the contents of the “vault”, which will effectively render
the “measured boot” mechanism meaningless.
Severity ?
8.8 (High)
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LF-Edge, Zededa | EVE OS |
Affected:
0 , < 9.5.0
(release)
|
Credits
Ilay Levi
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CVE-2023-43636 (GCVE-0-2023-43636)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2023-09-20 14:50 – Updated: 2024-09-24 18:32
VLAI?
Title
Rootfs Not Protected
Summary
In EVE OS, the “measured boot” mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing
the encrypted data located in the vault.
As per the “measured boot” design, the PCR values calculated at different stages of the boot
process will change if any of their respective parts are changed.
This includes, among other things, the configuration of the bios, grub, the kernel cmdline,
initrd, and more.
However, this mechanism does not validate the entire rootfs, so an attacker can edit the
filesystem and gain control over the system.
As the default filesystem used by EVE OS is squashfs, this is somewhat harder than an ext4,
which is easily changeable.
This will not stop an attacker, as an attacker can repackage the squashfs with their changes
in it and replace the partition altogether.
This can also be done directly on the device, as the “003-storage-init” container contains the
“mksquashfs” and “unsquashfs” binaries (with the corresponding libs).
An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.
Note:
This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:
• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141
• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.
This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot.
Severity ?
8.8 (High)
CWE
- CWE-345 - Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LF-Edge, Zededa | EVE OS |
Affected:
9.0.0 , < 9.5.0
(release)
Affected: 0 , < 8.6.0 (release) |
Credits
Ilay Levi
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CVE-2023-43630 (GCVE-0-2023-43630)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2023-09-20 14:37 – Updated: 2024-09-24 18:34
VLAI?
Title
Config Partition Not Measured From 2 Fronts
Summary
PCR14 is not in the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the “vault” key, but
due to the change that was implemented in commit
“7638364bc0acf8b5c481b5ce5fea11ad44ad7fd4”, fixing this issue alone would not solve the
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key, changes to the config partition would still not be measured.
An attacker could modify the config partition without triggering the measured boot, this could
result in the attacker gaining full control over the device with full access to the contents of the
encrypted “vault”
Severity ?
8.8 (High)
CWE
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LF-Edge, Zededa | EVE OS |
Affected:
9.0.0 , < 9.5.0
(release)
|
Credits
Ilay Levi
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