Most recent entries from osv_homebrew

BREW-gimme-aws-creds-CVE-2024-37891 — urllib3's Proxy-Authorization request header isn't stripped during cross-origin redirects

Thu, 13 Aug 2026 16:50:34 +0000

Affected: Homebrew: gimme-aws-creds

When using urllib3's proxy support with `ProxyManager`, the `Proxy-Authorization` header is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected.

However, when sending HTTP requests *without* using urllib3's proxy support, it's possible to accidentally configure the `Proxy-Authorization` header even though it won't have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn't treat the `Proxy-Authorization` HTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn't strip the header on cross-origin redirects.

Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the `Proxy-Authorization` header during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident.

Users should use urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the `Proxy-Authorization` header, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.

## Affected usages

We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:

* Setting the `Proxy-Authorization` header without using urllib3's built-in proxy support. * Not disabling HTTP redirects. * Either not using an HTTPS origin server or for the proxy or target origin to…

BREW-gimme-aws-creds-CVE-2023-45803 — urllib3's request body not stripped after redirect from 303 status changes request method to GET

Thu, 13 Aug 2026 16:50:34 +0000

Affected: Homebrew: gimme-aws-creds

urllib3 previously wouldn't remove the HTTP request body when an HTTP redirect response using status 303 "See Other" after the request had its method changed from one that could accept a request body (like `POST`) to `GET` as is required by HTTP RFCs. Although the behavior of removing the request body is not specified in the section for redirects, it can be inferred by piecing together information from different sections and we have observed the behavior in other major HTTP client implementations like curl and web browsers.

From [RFC 9110 Section 9.3.1](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110.html#name-get):

> A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a GET request unless it is made directly to an origin server that has previously indicated, in or out of band, that such a request has a purpose and will be adequately supported.

## Affected usages

Because the vulnerability requires a previously trusted service to become compromised in order to have an impact on confidentiality we believe the exploitability of this vulnerability is low. Additionally, many users aren't putting sensitive data in HTTP request bodies, if this is the case then this vulnerability isn't exploitable.

Both of the following conditions must be true to be affected by this vulnerability:

* If you're using urllib3 and submitting sensitive information in the HTTP request body (such as form data or JSON) * The origin service is compromised and starts redirecting using 303 to a malicious peer or the redirect…

BREW-gimme-aws-creds-CVE-2023-43804 — `Cookie` HTTP header isn't stripped on cross-origin redirects

Thu, 13 Aug 2026 16:50:34 +0000

Affected: Homebrew: gimme-aws-creds

urllib3 doesn't treat the `Cookie` HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify a `Cookie` header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly.

Users **must** handle redirects themselves instead of relying on urllib3's automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the `Cookie` header, thus we decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.

## Affected usages

We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:

* Using an affected version of urllib3 (patched in v1.26.17 and v2.0.6) * Using the `Cookie` header on requests, which is mostly typical for impersonating a browser. * Not disabling HTTP redirects * Either not using HTTPS or for the origin server to redirect to a malicious origin.

## Remediation

* Upgrading to at least urllib3 v1.26.17 or v2.0.6 * Disabling HTTP redirects using `redirects=False` when sending requests. * Not using the `Cookie` header.

BREW-dynaconf-CVE-2026-33154 — dynaconf Affected by Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure Template Evaluation in @jinja Resolver

Thu, 13 Aug 2026 16:44:51 +0000

Affected: Homebrew: dynaconf

### Summary Dynaconf is vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) due to unsafe template evaluation in the @jinja resolver. When the jinja2 package is installed, Dynaconf evaluates template expressions embedded in configuration values without a sandboxed environment.

If an attacker can influence configuration sources such as: environment variables .env files container environment configuration CI/CD secrets they can execute arbitrary OS commands on the host system. In addition, the @format resolver allows object graph traversal, which may expose sensitive runtime objects and environment variables.

### Details The vulnerability arises because Dynaconf's string resolvers lack proper security boundaries.

1. @jinja Resolver The @jinja resolver renders templates using full Jinja2 evaluation. However, the rendering context is not sandboxed, which allows attackers to access Python's internal attributes. Using objects such as cycler, attackers can reach Python's __globals__ and import the os module.

Example attack path cycler → __init__ → __globals__ → os → popen() This leads to arbitrary command execution.

2. @format Resolver The @format resolver performs Python string formatting using internal objects. This allows attackers to traverse Python's object graph and access sensitive runtime objects. Example traversal: {this.__class__.__init__.__globals__[os].environ} This can expose - API keys - database credentials - internal service tokens - environment secrets

##…

BREW-python-lsp-server-CVE-2026-54911 — UltraJSON: Malformed/Truncated UTF-8 Accepted and Silently Rewritten in ujson.dumps()

Thu, 13 Aug 2026 17:29:47 +0000

Affected: Homebrew: python-lsp-server

### Summary `ujson.dumps()` (or `ujson.dump()` or `ujson.encode()`) have a `reject_bytes=False` option. When set, they may accept malformed or truncated UTF-8 byte sequences, silently rewriting them into different Unicode characters instead of rejecting them. This leads to input validation bypass and data integrity issues.

### Details

The expected behavior is that for `x` being any bytes string, `x == ujson.loads(ujson.dumps(x, reject_bytes=False)).encode(errors="surrogatepass")` should always either be true or `ujson.dumps()` will throw an exception. In reality, some strings which should've been errors are silently rewritten as other strings:

* Invalid continuation bytes are replaced with valid ones: `b'\xcf\x13'` -> `b'\xcf\x93'` * Unterminated sequence completes the sequence: `b'\xc3'` -> `b'\xc3\x80'` * ... or leads to reading past the end of string: `b'\xf0\x90\x94'` -> `b"\xf0\x90\x94\x80inxcontrib'"`

### Impact

An application relying on reject_bytes=False for UTF-8 handling may experience:

- Data integrity issues - Experience validation bypass if said validation occurs before serialisation

### Remediation

The missing/broken UTF-8 validation checks were added/fixed in https://github.com/ultrajson/ultrajson/commit/169eaf36b1116fece5034ee79a7a0ef3f6deedcf. We recommend upgrading to [UltraJSON 5.13.0](https://github.com/ultrajson/ultrajson/releases/tag/5.13.0).

### Workarounds

Decoding bytes to strings in Python before passing them to `ujson.dumps()` avoids this…

BREW-python-lsp-server-CVE-2026-44660 — UltraJSON has a Memory Leak in ujson.dump() on Write Failure

Thu, 13 Aug 2026 17:29:47 +0000

Affected: Homebrew: python-lsp-server

### Summary

When `ujson.dump()` writes to a file-like object and the write operation raises an exception, the serialized JSON string object is not decremented, leaking memory. Each failed write operation leaks the full size of the serialized payload.

Code that uses `ujson.dumps()` rather than `ujson.dump()` or only JSON load/decode methods is unaffected.

### Details

**Vulnerability Location:** - `src/ujson/python/objToJSON.c:913` - `objToJSONFile()` function start - `src/ujson/python/objToJSON.c:931` - Error return on write failure - `src/ujson/python/objToJSON.c:942` - Early return without cleanup **Root Cause:**

The `objToJSONFile()` function allocates a Python string object via `ujson_dumps_internal()`, calls the file's `write()` method, and returns early if `write()` raises an exception—but never calls `Py_DECREF(string)` on the early exit path.

### PoC ```python import gc, tracemalloc, ujson

class BadFile: def write(self, s): raise RuntimeError("boom")

obj = {"x": "A" * 200000}

def run(): try: ujson.dump(obj, BadFile()) except RuntimeError: pass

run() tracemalloc.start() gc.collect() base = tracemalloc.get_traced_memory()[0]

for i in range(5): run() gc.collect() cur = tracemalloc.get_traced_memory()[0] print(i, cur - base) ```

### Impact

Any application that serializes data through `ujson.dump()` to an attacker-influenced file-like object that can fail can be driven into linear memory growth. An attacker…

BREW-python-lsp-server-CVE-2026-32875 — UltraJSON has an integer overflow handling large indent leads to buffer overflow or infinite loop

Thu, 13 Aug 2026 17:29:47 +0000

Affected: Homebrew: python-lsp-server

### Summary

`ujson.dumps()` crashes the Python interpreter (segmentation fault) when the product of the `indent` parameter and the nested depth of the input exceeds INT32_MAX. It can also get stuck in an infinite loop if the `indent` is a large negative number. Both are caused by an integer overflow/underflow whilst calculating how much memory to reserve for indentation. And both can be used to achieve denial of service.

(Note: A negative indent to `ujson` means add spaces after colons but do not add line breaks or indentation. It is unclear to the current maintainers whether this was ever even an intended feature or just a byproduct of the way it was written.)

### Exploitability

To be vulnerable, a service must call `ujson.dump()`/`ujson.dumps()`/`ujson.encode()` whilst giving untrusted users control over the `indent` parameter and not restrict that indentation to reasonably small non-negative values. (Even with the fix for this vulnerability, such usage is strongly advised against since even a bug-free JSON serialiser would be vulnerable to denial of service simply by the attacker requesting indents that have the server needlessly filling out gigabytes of whitespace.)

A service may also be vulnerable to the infinite loop if it uses a fixed _negative_ `indent`. An underflow always occurs for any negative indent when the input data is at least one level nested but, for small negative indents, the underflow is usually accidentally rectified by another overflow. As far as…

BREW-python-lsp-server-CVE-2026-32874 — UltraJSON has a Memory Leak parsing large integers allows DoS

Thu, 13 Aug 2026 17:29:47 +0000

Affected: Homebrew: python-lsp-server

#### Summary

ujson 5.4.0 to 5.11.0 inclusive contain an accumulating memory leak in JSON parsing _large_ (outside of the range [-2^63, 2^64 - 1]) integers.

#### Exploitability

Any service that calls `ujson.load()`/`ujson.loads()`/`ujson.decode()` on untrusted inputs is affected and vulnerable to denial of service attacks.

#### Details

The leaked memory is a copy of the string form of the integer plus an additional NULL byte. The leak occurs irrespective of whether the integer parses successfully or is rejected due to having more than `sys.get_int_max_str_digits()` digits, meaning that any sized leak per malicious JSON can be achieved provided that there is no limit on the overall size of the payload.

```python ujson.loads(str(2 ** 64 - 1)) # No leak ujson.loads(str(2 ** 64)) # Leaks ujson.loads(str(10 ** sys.get_int_max_str_digits())) # Leaks and raises ValueError ```

#### Fix

The leak is fixed in `ujson 5.12.0` (4baeb950df780092bd3c89fc702a868e99a3a1d2). There are no workarounds beyond upgrading to an unaffected version.

#### Credits

Discovered by Cameron Criswell/Skevros using Coverage-guided fuzzing (libFuzzer + AddressSanitizer)

BREW-python-lsp-server-CVE-2026-32274 — Black: Arbitrary file writes from unsanitized user input in cache file name

Thu, 13 Aug 2026 17:29:47 +0000

Affected: Homebrew: python-lsp-server

### Impact

Black writes a cache file, the name of which is computed from various formatting options. The value of the `--python-cell-magics` option was placed in the filename without sanitization, which allowed an attacker who controls the value of this argument to write cache files to arbitrary file system locations.

### Patches

Fixed in Black 26.3.1.

### Workarounds

Do not allow untrusted user input into the value of the `--python-cell-magics` option.

BREW-twtxt-GHSA-pjjw-qhg8-p2p9 — aiohttp has vulnerable dependency that is vulnerable to request smuggling

Thu, 13 Aug 2026 17:44:53 +0000

Affected: Homebrew: twtxt

### Summary llhttp 8.1.1 is vulnerable to two request smuggling vulnerabilities. Details have not been disclosed yet, so refer to llhttp for future information. The issue is resolved by using llhttp 9+ (which is included in aiohttp 3.8.6+).