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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 18:05:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-99018 — riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99018</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel
shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace.
It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which
compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the
current tp:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;beq	\prev, tp, _skip_scs
	scs_load_current
_skip_scs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tp is a user-writable register.  A user task that sets tp to the
linear-map address of its own task_struct (&amp;amp;current) before trapping
makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR
enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and
keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place.  Under
CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and
load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted
&amp;#34;sd ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; / &amp;#34;ld ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; in every non-leaf function then write
to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an
unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive.
The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload
is skipped on every subsequent entry as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Decide &amp;#34;came from userspace&amp;#34; from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already
in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that
ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later.  SPP is
written by hardware on trap entry a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel
shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace.
It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which
compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the
current tp:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;beq	\prev, tp, _skip_scs
	scs_load_current
_skip_scs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tp is a user-writable register.  A user task that sets tp to the
linear-map address of its own task_struct (&amp;amp;current) before trapping
makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR
enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and
keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place.  Under
CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and
load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted
&amp;#34;sd ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; / &amp;#34;ld ra, -8(gp)&amp;#34; in every non-leaf function then write
to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an
unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive.
The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload
is skipped on every subsequent entry as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Decide &amp;#34;came from userspace&amp;#34; from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already
in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that
ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later.  SPP is
written by hardware on trap entry a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99018</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>USN-9018-1 — linux, linux-aws, linux-gcp, linux-ibm, linux-oem-7.0, linux-oracle vulnerabilities</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/usn-9018-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-ibm, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-oem-7.0, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-oracle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel.
An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system.
This update corrects flaws in the following subsystems:
  - Network file systems library;
  - Stream parser;
  - ARM64 architecture;
  - PowerPC architecture;
  - RISC-V architecture;
  - S390 architecture;
  - User-Mode Linux (UML);
  - x86 architecture;
  - Block layer subsystem;
  - Android drivers;
  - Bluetooth drivers;
  - TPM device driver;
  - DPLL subsystem;
  - EDAC drivers;
  - GPIO subsystem;
  - GPU drivers;
  - HID subsystem;
  - IIO subsystem;
  - IIO ADC drivers;
  - InfiniBand drivers;
  - Input Device (Miscellaneous) drivers;
  - Multiple devices driver;
  - MemoryStick subsystem;
  - MMC subsystem;
  - MTD block device drivers;
  - Network drivers;
  - Ethernet bonding driver;
  - Mellanox network drivers;
  - STMicroelectronics network drivers;
  - Ethernet team driver;
  - MediaTek network drivers;
  - NVME drivers;
  - Device tree and open firmware driver;
  - Power sequencing drivers;
  - Voltage and Current Regulator drivers;
  - Real Time Clock drivers;
  - SCSI subsystem;
  - Greybus lights staging drivers;
  - Trusted Execution Environment drivers;
  - Thunderbolt and USB4 drivers;
  - TTY drivers;
  - Cadence USB3 driver;
  - USB Device Class drivers;
  - USB core drivers;
  - DesignWare USB2 driver;
  - DesignWare USB3 driver;
  - USB Gadget drivers;
  - USB Serial drivers;
  - USB Mass Storage drivers;
  - USB Type-C suppor…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-ibm, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-oem-7.0, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-oracle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel.
An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system.
This update corrects flaws in the following subsystems:
  - Network file systems library;
  - Stream parser;
  - ARM64 architecture;
  - PowerPC architecture;
  - RISC-V architecture;
  - S390 architecture;
  - User-Mode Linux (UML);
  - x86 architecture;
  - Block layer subsystem;
  - Android drivers;
  - Bluetooth drivers;
  - TPM device driver;
  - DPLL subsystem;
  - EDAC drivers;
  - GPIO subsystem;
  - GPU drivers;
  - HID subsystem;
  - IIO subsystem;
  - IIO ADC drivers;
  - InfiniBand drivers;
  - Input Device (Miscellaneous) drivers;
  - Multiple devices driver;
  - MemoryStick subsystem;
  - MMC subsystem;
  - MTD block device drivers;
  - Network drivers;
  - Ethernet bonding driver;
  - Mellanox network drivers;
  - STMicroelectronics network drivers;
  - Ethernet team driver;
  - MediaTek network drivers;
  - NVME drivers;
  - Device tree and open firmware driver;
  - Power sequencing drivers;
  - Voltage and Current Regulator drivers;
  - Real Time Clock drivers;
  - SCSI subsystem;
  - Greybus lights staging drivers;
  - Trusted Execution Environment drivers;
  - Thunderbolt and USB4 drivers;
  - TTY drivers;
  - Cadence USB3 driver;
  - USB Device Class drivers;
  - USB core drivers;
  - DesignWare USB2 driver;
  - DesignWare USB3 driver;
  - USB Gadget drivers;
  - USB Serial drivers;
  - USB Mass Storage drivers;
  - USB Type-C suppor…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/usn-9018-1</guid>
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