<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 21:16:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-92525 — RDMA/rxe: Validate num_sge/cur_sge before indexing wqe-&gt;dma.sge[]</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-92525</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rxe: Validate num_sge/cur_sge before indexing wqe-&amp;gt;dma.sge[]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For a user QP, qp-&amp;gt;sq.queue is a ring the application writes directly,
so rxe_post_send() takes the is_user branch and only schedules send_task
without validating the WQE. rxe_requester() consumes it in place via
req_next_wqe() and calls copy_data(), which indexes
&amp;amp;wqe-&amp;gt;dma.sge[cur_sge] with the attacker-controlled num_sge/cur_sge.
Only the kernel path bounds num_sge (validate_send_wr()); the user WQE
is never checked, so a local unprivileged user can post a WQE with an
out-of-range cur_sge or oversized num_sge and force an out-of-bounds
read of the per-WQE sge array in copy_data() (vmalloc OOB read, local
DoS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bound num_sge to qp-&amp;gt;sq.max_sge in rxe_requester() before use, the way
get_srq_wqe() already guards SRQ entries, and bound cur_sge only when
the WQE carries payload (dma.resid): copy_data() returns early on a
zero-length copy before touching dma-&amp;gt;sge[], so a zero-payload WQE --
the only kind a max_sge == 0 QP can post -- stays valid.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced under KASAN; the vmalloc-out-of-bounds in copy_data() is gone.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rxe: Validate num_sge/cur_sge before indexing wqe-&amp;gt;dma.sge[]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For a user QP, qp-&amp;gt;sq.queue is a ring the application writes directly,
so rxe_post_send() takes the is_user branch and only schedules send_task
without validating the WQE. rxe_requester() consumes it in place via
req_next_wqe() and calls copy_data(), which indexes
&amp;amp;wqe-&amp;gt;dma.sge[cur_sge] with the attacker-controlled num_sge/cur_sge.
Only the kernel path bounds num_sge (validate_send_wr()); the user WQE
is never checked, so a local unprivileged user can post a WQE with an
out-of-range cur_sge or oversized num_sge and force an out-of-bounds
read of the per-WQE sge array in copy_data() (vmalloc OOB read, local
DoS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bound num_sge to qp-&amp;gt;sq.max_sge in rxe_requester() before use, the way
get_srq_wqe() already guards SRQ entries, and bound cur_sge only when
the WQE carries payload (dma.resid): copy_data() returns early on a
zero-length copy before touching dma-&amp;gt;sge[], so a zero-payload WQE --
the only kind a max_sge == 0 QP can post -- stays valid.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced under KASAN; the vmalloc-out-of-bounds in copy_data() is gone.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-92525</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
