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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 08:13:39 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-89422 — TLS 1.3 client skips server authentication when ServerHello carries an unsolicited pre_shared_key extension</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-89422</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Erlang OTP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Key Exchange without Entity Authentication vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ssl allows a peer that answers a TLS 1.3 client connection to impersonate the intended server. A pre_shared_key extension in the ServerHello that the client never offered causes the client to complete the handshake without validating the server&amp;#39;s certificate, so ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket} against a peer holding no certificate, no private key and no prior session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tls_client_connection_1_3:handle_server_hello/2 passes the received extension to tls_gen_connection_1_3:handle_resumption/2, which sets resumption = true on its mere presence without checking that the client offered a PSK. tls_handshake_1_3:get_pre_shared_key/4 meanwhile falls back to the all-zero &amp;#34;no PSK&amp;#34; value and keys the handshake with the ordinary non-PSK schedule, so the attacker&amp;#39;s own ephemeral key suffices. The resumption flag then routes maybe_resumption/1 straight to wait_finished, skipping the certificate-handling states, so certificate path validation, verify_fun, hostname verification, partial_chain, CRL checking and OCSP stapling are all bypassed. The default client configuration is affected; clients restricted to TLS 1.2 are not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects OTP from OTP 22.2 before OTP 27.3.4.18, OTP 28.5.0.7, and OTP 29.1.1, corresponding to ssl from 9.5 before 11.2.12.13, 11.6.0.6, and 11.7.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Erlang OTP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Key Exchange without Entity Authentication vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ssl allows a peer that answers a TLS 1.3 client connection to impersonate the intended server. A pre_shared_key extension in the ServerHello that the client never offered causes the client to complete the handshake without validating the server&amp;#39;s certificate, so ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket} against a peer holding no certificate, no private key and no prior session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tls_client_connection_1_3:handle_server_hello/2 passes the received extension to tls_gen_connection_1_3:handle_resumption/2, which sets resumption = true on its mere presence without checking that the client offered a PSK. tls_handshake_1_3:get_pre_shared_key/4 meanwhile falls back to the all-zero &amp;#34;no PSK&amp;#34; value and keys the handshake with the ordinary non-PSK schedule, so the attacker&amp;#39;s own ephemeral key suffices. The resumption flag then routes maybe_resumption/1 straight to wait_finished, skipping the certificate-handling states, so certificate path validation, verify_fun, hostname verification, partial_chain, CRL checking and OCSP stapling are all bypassed. The default client configuration is affected; clients restricted to TLS 1.2 are not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects OTP from OTP 22.2 before OTP 27.3.4.18, OTP 28.5.0.7, and OTP 29.1.1, corresponding to ssl from 9.5 before 11.2.12.13, 11.6.0.6, and 11.7.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-89422</guid>
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