<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 15:39:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-65628 — Infinite recursion (CPU denial-of-service) in JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2 on mismatched key types</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-65628</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; potatosalad jose&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;jose_jwk:shared_secret/2 (exposed in Elixir as JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2) derives an ECDH shared secret from two JWKs. Its first function clause only matches when both JWKs carry the same key type (kty) module, and its fallback clause re-invokes itself as shared_secret(from(YourJWK), from(MyJWK)). Because from/1 returns an already-parsed jose_jwk record unchanged, passing two JWKs whose key types differ (for example an EC key and an RSA key) makes the fallback clause re-enter with identical arguments, producing an unbounded tail-recursive loop that never returns and never crashes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An application that derives a shared secret from an externally supplied peer public key without first checking that the peer key&amp;#39;s type and curve match its own key can be driven into this loop by an attacker-controlled JWK, pinning an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU. Repeated requests exhaust the available schedulers, resulting in a denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects jose: from 1.5.0 before 1.11.13.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; potatosalad jose&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;jose_jwk:shared_secret/2 (exposed in Elixir as JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2) derives an ECDH shared secret from two JWKs. Its first function clause only matches when both JWKs carry the same key type (kty) module, and its fallback clause re-invokes itself as shared_secret(from(YourJWK), from(MyJWK)). Because from/1 returns an already-parsed jose_jwk record unchanged, passing two JWKs whose key types differ (for example an EC key and an RSA key) makes the fallback clause re-enter with identical arguments, producing an unbounded tail-recursive loop that never returns and never crashes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An application that derives a shared secret from an externally supplied peer public key without first checking that the peer key&amp;#39;s type and curve match its own key can be driven into this loop by an attacker-controlled JWK, pinning an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU. Repeated requests exhaust the available schedulers, resulting in a denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects jose: from 1.5.0 before 1.11.13.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-65628</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
