https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 28 Oct 2026 15:38:58 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-65627 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> potatosalad jose</p> <p>Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node&#39;s memory with a small crafted JWE token.</p> <p>The jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.</p> <p>Decompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient&#39;s public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node&#39;s memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.</p> <p>This issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> potatosalad jose</p> <p>Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node&#39;s memory with a small crafted JWE token.</p> <p>The jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.</p> <p>Decompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient&#39;s public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node&#39;s memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.</p> <p>This issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-65627