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      <title>CVE-2026-49836 — psd-tools: arbitrary file write via smart-object filename</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-49836</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; psd-tools&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;psd-tools is a Python package for working with Adobe Photoshop PSD files. Prior to version 1.17.1, `SmartObject.save()` writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted `.psd` can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or `../`-traversing), outside its intended output directory. A secondary issue in `SmartObject.open()` for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled `fullPath` descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file read path, enabling exfiltration of the read content to the controlled write destination. Both issues are fixed in v1.17.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; psd-tools&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;psd-tools is a Python package for working with Adobe Photoshop PSD files. Prior to version 1.17.1, `SmartObject.save()` writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted `.psd` can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or `../`-traversing), outside its intended output directory. A secondary issue in `SmartObject.open()` for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled `fullPath` descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file read path, enabling exfiltration of the read content to the controlled write destination. Both issues are fixed in v1.17.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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