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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 22:20:26 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2021-47608 — bpf: Fix kernel address leakage in atomic fetch</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2021-47608</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix kernel address leakage in atomic fetch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The change in commit 37086bfdc737 (&amp;#34;bpf: Propagate stack bounds to registers
in atomics w/ BPF_FETCH&amp;#34;) around check_mem_access() handling is buggy since
this would allow for unprivileged users to leak kernel pointers. For example,
an atomic fetch/and with -1 on a stack destination which holds a spilled
pointer will migrate the spilled register type into a scalar, which can then
be exported out of the program (since scalar != pointer) by dumping it into
a map value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The original implementation of XADD was preventing this situation by using
a double call to check_mem_access() one with BPF_READ and a subsequent one
with BPF_WRITE, in both cases passing -1 as a placeholder value instead of
register as per XADD semantics since it didn&amp;#39;t contain a value fetch. The
BPF_READ also included a check in check_stack_read_fixed_off() which rejects
the program if the stack slot is of __is_pointer_value() if dst_regno &amp;lt; 0.
The latter is to distinguish whether we&amp;#39;re dealing with a regular stack spill/
fill or some arithmetical operation which is disallowed on non-scalars, see
also 6e7e63cbb023 (&amp;#34;bpf: Forbid XADD on spilled pointers for unprivileged
users&amp;#34;) for more context on check_mem_access() and its handling of placeholder
value -1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One minimally intrusive option to fix the leak is for the BPF_FETCH case to
initially check the BPF_READ case via check_mem_access() with -1…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix kernel address leakage in atomic fetch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The change in commit 37086bfdc737 (&amp;#34;bpf: Propagate stack bounds to registers
in atomics w/ BPF_FETCH&amp;#34;) around check_mem_access() handling is buggy since
this would allow for unprivileged users to leak kernel pointers. For example,
an atomic fetch/and with -1 on a stack destination which holds a spilled
pointer will migrate the spilled register type into a scalar, which can then
be exported out of the program (since scalar != pointer) by dumping it into
a map value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The original implementation of XADD was preventing this situation by using
a double call to check_mem_access() one with BPF_READ and a subsequent one
with BPF_WRITE, in both cases passing -1 as a placeholder value instead of
register as per XADD semantics since it didn&amp;#39;t contain a value fetch. The
BPF_READ also included a check in check_stack_read_fixed_off() which rejects
the program if the stack slot is of __is_pointer_value() if dst_regno &amp;lt; 0.
The latter is to distinguish whether we&amp;#39;re dealing with a regular stack spill/
fill or some arithmetical operation which is disallowed on non-scalars, see
also 6e7e63cbb023 (&amp;#34;bpf: Forbid XADD on spilled pointers for unprivileged
users&amp;#34;) for more context on check_mem_access() and its handling of placeholder
value -1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One minimally intrusive option to fix the leak is for the BPF_FETCH case to
initially check the BPF_READ case via check_mem_access() with -1…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2021-47608</guid>
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