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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-115915 — vLLM: Untrusted EPS inputs can trigger denial of service or Ghostscript RCE</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-115915</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; vllm-project vllm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.32.0, ImageMediaIO passes attacker-controlled image bytes to Pillow through Image.open(BytesIO(data)) without restricting decoder selection, and the MIME label does not constrain the selected format. Image-capable request paths through parse_image() and fetch_image() can therefore dispatch an EPS payload to host components. A host with Ghostscript affected by CVE-2024-29510 can execute commands with the vLLM process&amp;#39;s privileges, while environments using Pillow 12.0.0 through 12.2.0 can trigger CVE-2026-59203 and exhaust media-loading workers. Deployments without the applicable vulnerable dependency are not affected by that corresponding impact. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; vllm-project vllm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.32.0, ImageMediaIO passes attacker-controlled image bytes to Pillow through Image.open(BytesIO(data)) without restricting decoder selection, and the MIME label does not constrain the selected format. Image-capable request paths through parse_image() and fetch_image() can therefore dispatch an EPS payload to host components. A host with Ghostscript affected by CVE-2024-29510 can execute commands with the vLLM process&amp;#39;s privileges, while environments using Pillow 12.0.0 through 12.2.0 can trigger CVE-2026-59203 and exhaust media-loading workers. Deployments without the applicable vulnerable dependency are not affected by that corresponding impact. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-115915</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h3rc-j82p-2c3h — vLLM: Untrusted EPS inputs can trigger denial of service or Ghostscript RCE</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-h3rc-j82p-2c3h</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: vllm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In vLLM 0.30.0, `ImageMediaIO` passes attacker-controlled image bytes to Pillow&amp;#39;s format autodetection without restricting the accepted formats; the request&amp;#39;s MIME label does not constrain decoder selection. An EPS payload labeled `image/png` reached the host&amp;#39;s Ghostscript executable. On a host with Ghostscript affected by CVE-2024-29510, this exposes the known Ghostscript sandbox escape through vLLM&amp;#39;s image-loading path and can execute commands with the vLLM process&amp;#39;s privileges. A bounded marker-command payload executed through the PyPI wheel&amp;#39;s actual `ImageMediaIO.load_base64()` implementation using Debian Ghostscript 10.03.0. The loader-level execution is reproduced; the HTTP request path is source-traced but was not exercised end to end. This report concerns vLLM&amp;#39;s untrusted-format dispatch and does not claim a new Ghostscript vulnerability. Exploitation requires an image-capable request path, a caller able to reach it under the deployment&amp;#39;s authentication policy, and a vulnerable host Ghostscript build.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ImageMediaIO` is the boundary where attacker-controlled bytes enter Pillow&amp;#39;s format autodetection: the declared MIME type does not constrain decoder selection, and the loader calls `Image.open(BytesIO(data))` without a Pillow format allowlist. Pillow recognizes EPS by its file signature, and vLLM&amp;#39;s subsequent `image.load()` call enters Pillow&amp;#39;s EPS processing path. The OpenAI chat multimodal parser reaches this path through [`parse_image()` a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: vllm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In vLLM 0.30.0, `ImageMediaIO` passes attacker-controlled image bytes to Pillow&amp;#39;s format autodetection without restricting the accepted formats; the request&amp;#39;s MIME label does not constrain decoder selection. An EPS payload labeled `image/png` reached the host&amp;#39;s Ghostscript executable. On a host with Ghostscript affected by CVE-2024-29510, this exposes the known Ghostscript sandbox escape through vLLM&amp;#39;s image-loading path and can execute commands with the vLLM process&amp;#39;s privileges. A bounded marker-command payload executed through the PyPI wheel&amp;#39;s actual `ImageMediaIO.load_base64()` implementation using Debian Ghostscript 10.03.0. The loader-level execution is reproduced; the HTTP request path is source-traced but was not exercised end to end. This report concerns vLLM&amp;#39;s untrusted-format dispatch and does not claim a new Ghostscript vulnerability. Exploitation requires an image-capable request path, a caller able to reach it under the deployment&amp;#39;s authentication policy, and a vulnerable host Ghostscript build.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ImageMediaIO` is the boundary where attacker-controlled bytes enter Pillow&amp;#39;s format autodetection: the declared MIME type does not constrain decoder selection, and the loader calls `Image.open(BytesIO(data))` without a Pillow format allowlist. Pillow recognizes EPS by its file signature, and vLLM&amp;#39;s subsequent `image.load()` call enters Pillow&amp;#39;s EPS processing path. The OpenAI chat multimodal parser reaches this path through [`parse_image()` a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-h3rc-j82p-2c3h</guid>
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