https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 28 Sep 2026 17:49:24 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-88000 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-webui</p> <p>Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.10.0 until 0.11.1, DELETE /api/v1/chats/{id}/messages/{message_id} used the chat-history deletion helper in backend/open_webui/models/chats.py to follow childrenIds without recording visited message identifiers. An authenticated user could store a cyclic chat tree and delete a message, causing a synchronous infinite loop on the server request loop that blocked every user&#39;s requests until the process was killed. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.1.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-webui</p> <p>Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.10.0 until 0.11.1, DELETE /api/v1/chats/{id}/messages/{message_id} used the chat-history deletion helper in backend/open_webui/models/chats.py to follow childrenIds without recording visited message identifiers. An authenticated user could store a cyclic chat tree and delete a message, causing a synchronous infinite loop on the server request loop that blocked every user&#39;s requests until the process was killed. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.1.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-88000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-3cgp-3cqx-j8w2 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary Chat histories are stored as an unvalidated JSON object. After a message is deleted, the code that picks the chat&#39;s new current message walked down the `childrenIds` links without recording where it had already been. Any account with the default `user` role could store a chat whose messages list each other as children, then delete a message from it, and the walk would run forever. That walk runs on the server&#39;s request loop, so it blocks every other user&#39;s requests until the process is killed.</p> <p>## Preconditions One account with the default `user` role. No administrator rights, no additional permissions, no configuration change and no non-default setting: creating and deleting chats is available to every user out of the box. The attack runs entirely against the attacker&#39;s own chat, so no knowledge of any other user&#39;s data is needed. Versions before 0.10.0 are unaffected because neither the message-deletion endpoint nor the affected code existed.</p> <p>## Impact The walk is synchronous and runs on the asyncio event loop, so while it spins, every request from every user is blocked, including unauthenticated `/health` and administrator endpoints. External health checks and orchestrator liveness probes fail alongside the UI. This is a pure CPU pin with no list growth, so a worker consumes one full core with flat memory and has to be killed rather than being reclaimed by an out-of-memory kill. The work is not cancelled when the client disconnects, so a single fire-and-forget…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary Chat histories are stored as an unvalidated JSON object. After a message is deleted, the code that picks the chat&#39;s new current message walked down the `childrenIds` links without recording where it had already been. Any account with the default `user` role could store a chat whose messages list each other as children, then delete a message from it, and the walk would run forever. That walk runs on the server&#39;s request loop, so it blocks every other user&#39;s requests until the process is killed.</p> <p>## Preconditions One account with the default `user` role. No administrator rights, no additional permissions, no configuration change and no non-default setting: creating and deleting chats is available to every user out of the box. The attack runs entirely against the attacker&#39;s own chat, so no knowledge of any other user&#39;s data is needed. Versions before 0.10.0 are unaffected because neither the message-deletion endpoint nor the affected code existed.</p> <p>## Impact The walk is synchronous and runs on the asyncio event loop, so while it spins, every request from every user is blocked, including unauthenticated `/health` and administrator endpoints. External health checks and orchestrator liveness probes fail alongside the UI. This is a pure CPU pin with no list growth, so a worker consumes one full core with flat memory and has to be killed rather than being reclaimed by an out-of-memory kill. The work is not cancelled when the client disconnects, so a single fire-and-forget…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-3cgp-3cqx-j8w2