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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:44:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-71492 — Banks: Path traversal in `DirectoryPromptRegistry.set()` allows arbitrary file write outside the registry root</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-71492</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; masci banks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a simple template language. Prior to version 2.4.5, DirectoryPromptRegistry.set() in src/banks/registries/directory.py interpolates attacker-controlled Prompt.name and Prompt.version values into a Path without canonicalization or containment validation. Relative traversal such as ../victim/foo and an absolute Prompt.name can escape or discard the configured registry root, while overwrite=True permits replacement of existing target files. The poisoned name is persisted in index.json and reconstructed by _load(), allowing the out-of-root path to survive later registry loads. An application that forwards request data into these fields can therefore write Prompt.raw bytes to attacker-chosen paths writable by the application process. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; masci banks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a simple template language. Prior to version 2.4.5, DirectoryPromptRegistry.set() in src/banks/registries/directory.py interpolates attacker-controlled Prompt.name and Prompt.version values into a Path without canonicalization or containment validation. Relative traversal such as ../victim/foo and an absolute Prompt.name can escape or discard the configured registry root, while overwrite=True permits replacement of existing target files. The poisoned name is persisted in index.json and reconstructed by _load(), allowing the out-of-root path to survive later registry loads. An application that forwards request data into these fields can therefore write Prompt.raw bytes to attacker-chosen paths writable by the application process. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-71492</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-x8wg-4xgc-vr54 — Banks: Path traversal in `DirectoryPromptRegistry.set()` allows arbitrary file write outside the registry root</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-x8wg-4xgc-vr54</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: banks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`DirectoryPromptRegistry.set()` interpolates the attacker-controllable `Prompt.name` into a `Path` expression with no canonicalization. An application that derives the prompt name from request data lets a caller write attacker-controlled bytes outside the configured registry directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/banks/registries/directory.py:44`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
prompt_file = path / f&amp;#34;{prompt.name}.{prompt.version}.jinja&amp;#34;
prompt_file.write_text(prompt.raw)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two failure modes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Relative traversal.** `name=&amp;#34;../victim/foo&amp;#34;` resolves to `&amp;lt;registry&amp;gt;/../victim/foo.0.jinja` — outside the configured root.
2. **Absolute-path bypass.** `pathlib` documents that `Path(&amp;#34;/a&amp;#34;) / Path(&amp;#34;/b&amp;#34;)` returns `Path(&amp;#34;/b&amp;#34;)`. So `name=&amp;#34;/abs/path&amp;#34;` discards the registry root entirely; the registry is never consulted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The poisoned `name` is then persisted to `index.json`, so the out-of-root path keeps reconstructing on later `_load()` calls (`directory.py:135-141`). With `overwrite=True`, existing files at the target path are replaced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from banks import Prompt
from banks.registries import DirectoryPromptRegistry&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;work = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp())
registry = work / &amp;#34;registry&amp;#34;; registry.mkdir()
victim   = work / &amp;#34;victim&amp;#34;;   victim.mkdir()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;reg = DirectoryPromptRegistry(str(registry))&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# (1) Relative traversal
reg.set(prompt=Prompt(&amp;#34;pwn&amp;#34;, name=&amp;#34;../victim/pwned&amp;#34;, version=&amp;#34;0&amp;#34;))
print((victim / &amp;#34;pwned.0.jinja&amp;#34;).read_text())…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: banks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`DirectoryPromptRegistry.set()` interpolates the attacker-controllable `Prompt.name` into a `Path` expression with no canonicalization. An application that derives the prompt name from request data lets a caller write attacker-controlled bytes outside the configured registry directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/banks/registries/directory.py:44`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
prompt_file = path / f&amp;#34;{prompt.name}.{prompt.version}.jinja&amp;#34;
prompt_file.write_text(prompt.raw)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two failure modes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Relative traversal.** `name=&amp;#34;../victim/foo&amp;#34;` resolves to `&amp;lt;registry&amp;gt;/../victim/foo.0.jinja` — outside the configured root.
2. **Absolute-path bypass.** `pathlib` documents that `Path(&amp;#34;/a&amp;#34;) / Path(&amp;#34;/b&amp;#34;)` returns `Path(&amp;#34;/b&amp;#34;)`. So `name=&amp;#34;/abs/path&amp;#34;` discards the registry root entirely; the registry is never consulted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The poisoned `name` is then persisted to `index.json`, so the out-of-root path keeps reconstructing on later `_load()` calls (`directory.py:135-141`). With `overwrite=True`, existing files at the target path are replaced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from banks import Prompt
from banks.registries import DirectoryPromptRegistry&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;work = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp())
registry = work / &amp;#34;registry&amp;#34;; registry.mkdir()
victim   = work / &amp;#34;victim&amp;#34;;   victim.mkdir()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;reg = DirectoryPromptRegistry(str(registry))&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# (1) Relative traversal
reg.set(prompt=Prompt(&amp;#34;pwn&amp;#34;, name=&amp;#34;../victim/pwned&amp;#34;, version=&amp;#34;0&amp;#34;))
print((victim / &amp;#34;pwned.0.jinja&amp;#34;).read_text())…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-x8wg-4xgc-vr54</guid>
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