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      <title>CVE-2026-46519 — mcp-server-kubernetes Affected By Tool Access Control Bypass: Presentation-Layer Filtering Without Execution-Layer Enfo…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-46519</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Flux159 mcp-server-kubernetes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mcp-server-kubernetes is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes cluster management. Prior to version 3.6.0, mcp-server-kubernetes exposes three environment variables (ALLOW_ONLY_READONLY_TOOLS, ALLOW_ONLY_NON_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS, ALLOWED_TOOLS) documented as access controls for restricting which Kubernetes operations are available. These controls are enforced at the tool discovery layer (tools/list) but not at the execution layer (tools/call). Any client that knows a tool name can invoke it directly regardless of the configured restriction mode. The access control was effectively cosmetic. This issue has been patched in version 3.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Flux159 mcp-server-kubernetes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mcp-server-kubernetes is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes cluster management. Prior to version 3.6.0, mcp-server-kubernetes exposes three environment variables (ALLOW_ONLY_READONLY_TOOLS, ALLOW_ONLY_NON_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS, ALLOWED_TOOLS) documented as access controls for restricting which Kubernetes operations are available. These controls are enforced at the tool discovery layer (tools/list) but not at the execution layer (tools/call). Any client that knows a tool name can invoke it directly regardless of the configured restriction mode. The access control was effectively cosmetic. This issue has been patched in version 3.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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