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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:17:23 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-99383 — smb: client: reclaim credits for decrypted reads with no matching mid</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99383</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: reclaim credits for decrypted reads with no matching mid&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a decrypted SMB2 READ response carries a MessageId that matches no
outstanding request, both the inline receive_encrypted_read() and the
offloaded smb2_decrypt_offload() paths drop the frame without accounting
the credits the server granted in it.  The plaintext unknown-frame path in
cifs_demultiplex_thread() already reclaims them with
smb2_add_credits_from_hdr(), so encrypted reads leak credits that the
plaintext path would not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This also happens for legitimate frames - e.g. a reply that arrives after
the client has timed out and dropped the mid - so over a long-lived
connection the client&amp;#39;s credit count drifts down and can eventually starve
it of the ability to issue requests.  The frame is AEAD-authenticated, so
the granted credits in the decrypted header come from the real server and
are safe to apply.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reclaim the credits from the decrypted header before dropping the frame,
and export smb2_add_credits_from_hdr() so the SMB2 receive paths can use it.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: reclaim credits for decrypted reads with no matching mid&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a decrypted SMB2 READ response carries a MessageId that matches no
outstanding request, both the inline receive_encrypted_read() and the
offloaded smb2_decrypt_offload() paths drop the frame without accounting
the credits the server granted in it.  The plaintext unknown-frame path in
cifs_demultiplex_thread() already reclaims them with
smb2_add_credits_from_hdr(), so encrypted reads leak credits that the
plaintext path would not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This also happens for legitimate frames - e.g. a reply that arrives after
the client has timed out and dropped the mid - so over a long-lived
connection the client&amp;#39;s credit count drifts down and can eventually starve
it of the ability to issue requests.  The frame is AEAD-authenticated, so
the granted credits in the decrypted header come from the real server and
are safe to apply.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reclaim the credits from the decrypted header before dropping the frame,
and export smb2_add_credits_from_hdr() so the SMB2 receive paths can use it.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99383</guid>
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