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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 23:09:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-98612 — net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done()</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98612</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;catc_rx_done() walks a multi-packet URB, reading a two-byte length from
each packet header. Its bound, pkt_len &amp;gt; urb-&amp;gt;actual_length, ignores the
header offset and compares against the whole transfer rather than the
bytes left from pkt_start, so a crafted packet header makes
skb_copy_to_linear_data() read past the buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A length below ETH_HLEN is also accepted, including zero, and
eth_type_trans() then reads a MAC header from the uninitialised tailroom
of a shorter skb. The is_f5u011 branch takes its length straight from
the transfer, so a zero-length URB reaches the same path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Track the bytes remaining from the current packet, and reject a header
that does not fit, a length past what is left, and a length below an
Ethernet header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A transfer shorter than an Ethernet header, including a zero-length one,
previously became a runt skb passed to netif_rx() and counted as
received; it is now counted in rx_length_errors and ends the walk.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;catc_rx_done() walks a multi-packet URB, reading a two-byte length from
each packet header. Its bound, pkt_len &amp;gt; urb-&amp;gt;actual_length, ignores the
header offset and compares against the whole transfer rather than the
bytes left from pkt_start, so a crafted packet header makes
skb_copy_to_linear_data() read past the buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A length below ETH_HLEN is also accepted, including zero, and
eth_type_trans() then reads a MAC header from the uninitialised tailroom
of a shorter skb. The is_f5u011 branch takes its length straight from
the transfer, so a zero-length URB reaches the same path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Track the bytes remaining from the current packet, and reject a header
that does not fit, a length past what is left, and a length below an
Ethernet header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A transfer shorter than an Ethernet header, including a zero-length one,
previously became a runt skb passed to netif_rx() and counted as
received; it is now counted in rx_length_errors and ends the walk.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98612</guid>
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