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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 03:43:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-98482 — nfc: llcp: drop truncated I/RR/RNR PDUs in nfc_llcp_recv_hdlc()</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98482</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfc: llcp: drop truncated I/RR/RNR PDUs in nfc_llcp_recv_hdlc()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfc_llcp_recv_hdlc() reads the sequence byte skb-&amp;gt;data[2], via
nfc_llcp_ns()/nfc_llcp_nr(), before any length check. The receive path
only guarantees the two-byte LLCP header -- __nfc_llcp_recv() checks it
with pskb_may_pull() and nfc_llcp_recv_agf() admits two-byte inner PDUs
-- so a two-byte I, RR or RNR PDU reads one byte of uninitialised skb
tailroom. The byte becomes N(R)/N(S); a peer can already set those with
a well-formed PDU, so this is acting on uninitialised memory, not new
peer control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Guard the read with pskb_may_pull(), as commit 95674f506c63 (&amp;#34;nfc: llcp:
reject PDUs shorter than the LLCP header&amp;#34;) did for the two-byte header,
so the sequence byte is present and linear before it is read. RR and RNR
PDUs are LLCP_HEADER_SIZE + LLCP_SEQUENCE_SIZE bytes and an I PDU is
longer, so no valid frame is rejected; a truncated PDU is malformed, so
return without a DM reply.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfc: llcp: drop truncated I/RR/RNR PDUs in nfc_llcp_recv_hdlc()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfc_llcp_recv_hdlc() reads the sequence byte skb-&amp;gt;data[2], via
nfc_llcp_ns()/nfc_llcp_nr(), before any length check. The receive path
only guarantees the two-byte LLCP header -- __nfc_llcp_recv() checks it
with pskb_may_pull() and nfc_llcp_recv_agf() admits two-byte inner PDUs
-- so a two-byte I, RR or RNR PDU reads one byte of uninitialised skb
tailroom. The byte becomes N(R)/N(S); a peer can already set those with
a well-formed PDU, so this is acting on uninitialised memory, not new
peer control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Guard the read with pskb_may_pull(), as commit 95674f506c63 (&amp;#34;nfc: llcp:
reject PDUs shorter than the LLCP header&amp;#34;) did for the two-byte header,
so the sequence byte is present and linear before it is read. RR and RNR
PDUs are LLCP_HEADER_SIZE + LLCP_SEQUENCE_SIZE bytes and an I PDU is
longer, so no valid frame is rejected; a truncated PDU is malformed, so
return without a DM reply.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98482</guid>
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