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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 19:46:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2022-49562 — KVM: x86: Use __try_cmpxchg_user() to update guest PTE A/D bits</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2022-49562</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: x86: Use __try_cmpxchg_user() to update guest PTE A/D bits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use the recently introduced __try_cmpxchg_user() to update guest PTE A/D
bits instead of mapping the PTE into kernel address space.  The VM_PFNMAP
path is broken as it assumes that vm_pgoff is the base pfn of the mapped
VMA range, which is conceptually wrong as vm_pgoff is the offset relative
to the file and has nothing to do with the pfn.  The horrific hack worked
for the original use case (backing guest memory with /dev/mem), but leads
to accessing &amp;#34;random&amp;#34; pfns for pretty much any other VM_PFNMAP case.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: x86: Use __try_cmpxchg_user() to update guest PTE A/D bits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use the recently introduced __try_cmpxchg_user() to update guest PTE A/D
bits instead of mapping the PTE into kernel address space.  The VM_PFNMAP
path is broken as it assumes that vm_pgoff is the base pfn of the mapped
VMA range, which is conceptually wrong as vm_pgoff is the offset relative
to the file and has nothing to do with the pfn.  The horrific hack worked
for the original use case (backing guest memory with /dev/mem), but leads
to accessing &amp;#34;random&amp;#34; pfns for pretty much any other VM_PFNMAP case.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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