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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 14:09:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-100716 — Froxlor before 2.3.12 Privilege Escalation via Symlink</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-100716</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; froxlor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Froxlor is a server administration panel. In versions 2.3.10 and earlier, the customer data-export (DataDump) cron fails to validate intermediate path components of the export destination: Froxlor\FileDir::makeCorrectDir() contains an off-by-one in its path-component walk that skips the first segment below the customer home directory, and the guard in ExportCron.php checks only the final component with is_link(). An authenticated customer whose account has the export feature enabled can schedule an export into a genuine subdirectory of their own webspace, then replace an intermediate path component with a symlink before the root-owned cron runs. The cron&amp;#39;s `chown -R` then recursively changes ownership of the linked directory tree — for example /etc — to the customer&amp;#39;s UID, yielding host root and cross-tenant compromise. Exploitation is deterministic and requires no race. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-75h4-... The issue is fixed in Froxlor 2.3.12.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; froxlor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Froxlor is a server administration panel. In versions 2.3.10 and earlier, the customer data-export (DataDump) cron fails to validate intermediate path components of the export destination: Froxlor\FileDir::makeCorrectDir() contains an off-by-one in its path-component walk that skips the first segment below the customer home directory, and the guard in ExportCron.php checks only the final component with is_link(). An authenticated customer whose account has the export feature enabled can schedule an export into a genuine subdirectory of their own webspace, then replace an intermediate path component with a symlink before the root-owned cron runs. The cron&amp;#39;s `chown -R` then recursively changes ownership of the linked directory tree — for example /etc — to the customer&amp;#39;s UID, yielding host root and cross-tenant compromise. Exploitation is deterministic and requires no race. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-75h4-... The issue is fixed in Froxlor 2.3.12.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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