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      <title>CVE-2026-69155 — Atomic Server: Stored XSS via uploaded files served inline (same-origin) on `/download` → account takeover</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-69155</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ontola atomic-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Atomic Server is an open source headless CMS and real-time database. From 0.30.0 until 0.40.3, an authenticated Agent with folder write access can use POST /upload to store HTML or SVG content that GET /download/{path} serves from the application origin through server/src/handlers/download.rs. The response sets Content-Disposition: inline and lacks forced attachment handling and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, allowing the browser to render the uploaded active content as the application. When a victim opens the link, the script can access the JavaScript-readable atomic_session cookie and the Agent private key in same-origin IndexedDB, enabling persistent account impersonation. This issue is fixed in version 0.40.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ontola atomic-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Atomic Server is an open source headless CMS and real-time database. From 0.30.0 until 0.40.3, an authenticated Agent with folder write access can use POST /upload to store HTML or SVG content that GET /download/{path} serves from the application origin through server/src/handlers/download.rs. The response sets Content-Disposition: inline and lacks forced attachment handling and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, allowing the browser to render the uploaded active content as the application. When a victim opens the link, the script can access the JavaScript-readable atomic_session cookie and the Agent private key in same-origin IndexedDB, enabling persistent account impersonation. This issue is fixed in version 0.40.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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