https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 08 Nov 2026 21:36:43 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cleanstart-2026-ze24156 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: rustup</p> <p>Security vulnerability affects the rustup package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: rustup</p> <p>Security vulnerability affects the rustup package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cleanstart-2026-ze24156 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/rustsec-2026-0349 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: rustls</p> <p>The client recorded the server-selected key exchange group for each server name when processing the ServerHello, before the server was authenticated. This record is used to predict which key share to send in future ClientHellos to that server name.</p> <p>A network attacker can answer one connection attempt with a ServerHello selecting X25519, and then close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that name carry only an X25519 key share, while `supported_groups` still lists X25519MLKEM768 first. If the genuine server accepts that share rather than sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake completes with classical-only key exchange and no error. This persists for as long as the entry stays in the client&#39;s session store.</p> <p>The impact is loss of post-quantum confidentiality for affected connections (&#34;harvest now, decrypt later&#34;). There is no key compromise and no authentication bypass.</p> <p>The following are not affected:</p> <p>- connections to servers which send a HelloRetryRequest for their preferred group, - clients with resumption disabled (as nothing is stored), and - other server names.</p> <p>This behaviour is discussed in [draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction-01.html#name-security-considerations), so the practical impact depends largely on server policy.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: rustls</p> <p>The client recorded the server-selected key exchange group for each server name when processing the ServerHello, before the server was authenticated. This record is used to predict which key share to send in future ClientHellos to that server name.</p> <p>A network attacker can answer one connection attempt with a ServerHello selecting X25519, and then close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that name carry only an X25519 key share, while `supported_groups` still lists X25519MLKEM768 first. If the genuine server accepts that share rather than sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake completes with classical-only key exchange and no error. This persists for as long as the entry stays in the client&#39;s session store.</p> <p>The impact is loss of post-quantum confidentiality for affected connections (&#34;harvest now, decrypt later&#34;). There is no key compromise and no authentication bypass.</p> <p>The following are not affected:</p> <p>- connections to servers which send a HelloRetryRequest for their preferred group, - clients with resumption disabled (as nothing is stored), and - other server names.</p> <p>This behaviour is discussed in [draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction-01.html#name-security-considerations), so the practical impact depends largely on server policy.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/rustsec-2026-0349