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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 14:10:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-92289 — Lemonldap::NG::Portal versions from 2.23.0 before 2.23.4 for Perl allow a PKCE bypass for public Relying Parties in "PK…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-92289</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Lemonldap-NG-Portal&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Lemonldap::NG::Portal versions from 2.23.0 before 2.23.4 for Perl allow a PKCE bypass for public Relying Parties in &amp;#34;PKCE or secret&amp;#34; mode because checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials does not verify the client secret.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With oidcRPMetaDataOptionsRequirePKCE set to 2, the authorization endpoint issues a code even when the request carries no code_challenge, and token() admits the exchange as long as a challenge was stored or an authentication method was returned for the caller. checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials() skips the secret comparison for a Relying Party marked public and still returns the method deduced from the request, so any Basic or form credential satisfies the secret branch. validatePKCEChallenge() then passes, because neither a challenge nor a verifier is present.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who intercepts an authorization code issued to a public Relying Party can exchange it for the user&amp;#39;s access, ID and refresh tokens by replaying the client_id with an arbitrary secret, which is the attack PKCE prevents. Dynamic client registration creates every Relying Party in this mode.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Lemonldap-NG-Portal&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Lemonldap::NG::Portal versions from 2.23.0 before 2.23.4 for Perl allow a PKCE bypass for public Relying Parties in &amp;#34;PKCE or secret&amp;#34; mode because checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials does not verify the client secret.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With oidcRPMetaDataOptionsRequirePKCE set to 2, the authorization endpoint issues a code even when the request carries no code_challenge, and token() admits the exchange as long as a challenge was stored or an authentication method was returned for the caller. checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials() skips the secret comparison for a Relying Party marked public and still returns the method deduced from the request, so any Basic or form credential satisfies the secret branch. validatePKCEChallenge() then passes, because neither a challenge nor a verifier is present.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who intercepts an authorization code issued to a public Relying Party can exchange it for the user&amp;#39;s access, ID and refresh tokens by replaying the client_id with an arbitrary secret, which is the attack PKCE prevents. Dynamic client registration creates every Relying Party in this mode.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-92289</guid>
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