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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 22:45:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-99063 — dm ioctl: don't let data_start run past the buffer</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99063</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dm ioctl: don&amp;#39;t let data_start run past the buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct dm_ioctl has seven bytes of trailing padding, so the smallest
buffer userspace is allowed to ask for, offsetof(struct dm_ioctl, data),
is seven bytes shorter than sizeof(struct dm_ioctl).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;get_result_buffer() sets data_start to sizeof(struct dm_ioctl) without
looking at how big the buffer actually is. Ask for the minimum and
data_start ends up seven bytes past the end. Callers add it to
data_size, and ctl_ioctl() copies that much back to userspace:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0xad/0xd0
  Read of size 312 at addr ffff8880169e4c00 by task repro-dm/140
   ctl_ioctl+0x5e3/0xcb0
   dm_ctl_ioctl+0x25/0x40
  allocated 305-byte region [ffff8880169e4c00, ffff8880169e4d31)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A DM_LIST_DEVICES with data_size set to 305 is enough to hit it, and the
seven bytes that leak are whatever sat next to the allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp data_start to the buffer size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that this is not a security bug because the out-of-bounds read can
only be triggered by root.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dm ioctl: don&amp;#39;t let data_start run past the buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct dm_ioctl has seven bytes of trailing padding, so the smallest
buffer userspace is allowed to ask for, offsetof(struct dm_ioctl, data),
is seven bytes shorter than sizeof(struct dm_ioctl).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;get_result_buffer() sets data_start to sizeof(struct dm_ioctl) without
looking at how big the buffer actually is. Ask for the minimum and
data_start ends up seven bytes past the end. Callers add it to
data_size, and ctl_ioctl() copies that much back to userspace:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0xad/0xd0
  Read of size 312 at addr ffff8880169e4c00 by task repro-dm/140
   ctl_ioctl+0x5e3/0xcb0
   dm_ctl_ioctl+0x25/0x40
  allocated 305-byte region [ffff8880169e4c00, ffff8880169e4d31)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A DM_LIST_DEVICES with data_size set to 305 is enough to hit it, and the
seven bytes that leak are whatever sat next to the allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp data_start to the buffer size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that this is not a security bug because the out-of-bounds read can
only be triggered by root.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99063</guid>
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