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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-114359</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-114359</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Eclipse Foundation Eclipse Kura&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Eclipse Kura downloads deployment packages (DPs) from a remote URL without any limit on the size of the data it receives. A malicious or compromised HTTP(S) server, or an attacker able to tamper with a plain-HTTP download, can stream an arbitrarily large (or endless) response. Kura writes the response to local storage until the filesystem is full. On gateways the temporary directory is often a RAM-backed tmpfs, so this can also exhaust memory. The result is denial of service of the device: failed configuration persistence, failed logging and possible crashes of the framework or other services.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same missing size limit is present in the REST upload endpoint `POST /deploy/v2/_upload`, which copies the request body to the temporary directory with no limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Workarounds: only install DPs from trusted HTTPS sources, restrict who can install packages (Web UI `kura.packages.admin` permission, REST `kura.permission.rest.deploy`, cloud DEPLOY-V2 access).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Eclipse Foundation Eclipse Kura&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Eclipse Kura downloads deployment packages (DPs) from a remote URL without any limit on the size of the data it receives. A malicious or compromised HTTP(S) server, or an attacker able to tamper with a plain-HTTP download, can stream an arbitrarily large (or endless) response. Kura writes the response to local storage until the filesystem is full. On gateways the temporary directory is often a RAM-backed tmpfs, so this can also exhaust memory. The result is denial of service of the device: failed configuration persistence, failed logging and possible crashes of the framework or other services.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same missing size limit is present in the REST upload endpoint `POST /deploy/v2/_upload`, which copies the request body to the temporary directory with no limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Workarounds: only install DPs from trusted HTTPS sources, restrict who can install packages (Web UI `kura.packages.admin` permission, REST `kura.permission.rest.deploy`, cloud DEPLOY-V2 access).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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