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      <title>CVE-2026-102427 — Joomla Extension - ordasoft.com - Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in OrdaSoft Joomla CCK &lt; 8.3.16</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-102427</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ordasoft.com OrdaSoft Joomla CCK&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Joomla Extension - ordasoft.com - Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in OrdaSoft Joomla CCK &amp;lt; 8.3.16 - site/uploader.php is reached through the component’s normal frontend routing (task=getContent), a task with no authentication or ACL check anywhere in the dispatch chain. The handler validates the uploaded file’s content with a real magic-byte MIME check, but the extension allow-list that would otherwise restrict the saved file’s extension was present in the source and commented out. The saved file’s extension was taken directly from the attacker-supplied filename with no validation, and the file was written to a path directly under the Joomla web root that is executed by the PHP handler. An image/PHP polyglot, a file whose header bytes satisfy the MIME check with PHP source appended after, passed the content check while carrying a .php extension of the attacker’s choosing.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ordasoft.com OrdaSoft Joomla CCK&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Joomla Extension - ordasoft.com - Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in OrdaSoft Joomla CCK &amp;lt; 8.3.16 - site/uploader.php is reached through the component’s normal frontend routing (task=getContent), a task with no authentication or ACL check anywhere in the dispatch chain. The handler validates the uploaded file’s content with a real magic-byte MIME check, but the extension allow-list that would otherwise restrict the saved file’s extension was present in the source and commented out. The saved file’s extension was taken directly from the attacker-supplied filename with no validation, and the file was written to a path directly under the Joomla web root that is executed by the PHP handler. An image/PHP polyglot, a file whose header bytes satisfy the MIME check with PHP source appended after, passed the content check while carrying a .php extension of the attacker’s choosing.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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