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      <title>CVE-2026-102748 — Dgraph: Zero Unauthenticated HTTP Admin removeNode Denial of Service</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-102748</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; dgraph-io dgraph&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dgraph is an open source distributed GraphQL database. Prior to 25.4.0, Dgraph Zero registers administrative HTTP routes on port 6080 without authentication when the administrative interface is enabled. The /removeNode route accepts attacker-controlled id and group values and passes them to Server.RemoveNode, where group 0 can trigger ProposePeerRemoval. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Zero HTTP port can read topology through /state, allocate identifiers through /assign, access the exposed /moveTablet administrative route, or remove membership through /removeNode, disrupting the Zero control plane and destabilizing Alpha nodes that depend on Zero. The route registration occurs in dgraph/cmd/zero/run.go, and the demonstrated membership-removal path reaches Server.RemoveNode and ProposePeerRemoval. This issue is fixed in version 25.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; dgraph-io dgraph&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dgraph is an open source distributed GraphQL database. Prior to 25.4.0, Dgraph Zero registers administrative HTTP routes on port 6080 without authentication when the administrative interface is enabled. The /removeNode route accepts attacker-controlled id and group values and passes them to Server.RemoveNode, where group 0 can trigger ProposePeerRemoval. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Zero HTTP port can read topology through /state, allocate identifiers through /assign, access the exposed /moveTablet administrative route, or remove membership through /removeNode, disrupting the Zero control plane and destabilizing Alpha nodes that depend on Zero. The route registration occurs in dgraph/cmd/zero/run.go, and the demonstrated membership-removal path reaches Server.RemoveNode and ProposePeerRemoval. This issue is fixed in version 25.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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