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      <title>CVE-2026-100611 — Capgo apikey_manager Role Privilege Escalation via Incomplete Role Deny-list</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-100611</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Cap-go capgo.app&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Capgo (capgo.app backend, versions ≤ 12.261.0) improperly restricts which roles the apikey_manager organization role may bind to newly created API keys. When an authenticated user holding only apikey_manager (permissions org.manage_apikeys and org.read) calls POST /apikey with a JWT session, the only checks applied are the org.manage_apikeys permission, a fixed deny-list of assignable role names (APIKEY_MANAGER_DENIED_ASSIGNABLE_ROLES in public/apikey/scope.ts), and a priority-rank comparison in createRoleBindingForPrincipal (private/role_bindings.ts). No check verifies that the caller actually holds the permissions conferred by the role being assigned. Because the deny-list omits the deploy roles app_developer, app_uploader, channel_developer and channel_uploader, and apikey_manager is seeded with priority_rank 78 — higher than those roles&amp;#39; ranks (68, 66, 58, 57) — the rank check also passes. As a result, an apikey_manager who cannot upload bundles or promote channels can mint an API key bound to a deploy role and use it to push arbitrary OTA JavaScript updates to all end users of the organization&amp;#39;s apps. As of the advisory publication no patched version was available.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Cap-go capgo.app&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Capgo (capgo.app backend, versions ≤ 12.261.0) improperly restricts which roles the apikey_manager organization role may bind to newly created API keys. When an authenticated user holding only apikey_manager (permissions org.manage_apikeys and org.read) calls POST /apikey with a JWT session, the only checks applied are the org.manage_apikeys permission, a fixed deny-list of assignable role names (APIKEY_MANAGER_DENIED_ASSIGNABLE_ROLES in public/apikey/scope.ts), and a priority-rank comparison in createRoleBindingForPrincipal (private/role_bindings.ts). No check verifies that the caller actually holds the permissions conferred by the role being assigned. Because the deny-list omits the deploy roles app_developer, app_uploader, channel_developer and channel_uploader, and apikey_manager is seeded with priority_rank 78 — higher than those roles&amp;#39; ranks (68, 66, 58, 57) — the rank check also passes. As a result, an apikey_manager who cannot upload bundles or promote channels can mint an API key bound to a deploy role and use it to push arbitrary OTA JavaScript updates to all end users of the organization&amp;#39;s apps. As of the advisory publication no patched version was available.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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