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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:22:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-99734 — mm/shmem: make shmem_file() check the file's inode</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99734</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/shmem: make shmem_file() check the file&amp;#39;s inode&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;shmem_file() only checks if file-&amp;gt;f_mapping is a shmem mapping. This
mapping can belong to another file, however, as with a Coda file backed
by a tmpfs container after mmap().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So it does not guarantee that the file inode is an actual shmem inode.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Seal handling and memfd preservation use this check before accessing
shmem inode state, so they can access an inode of the wrong type.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let&amp;#39;s make shmem_file() check the inode&amp;#39;s file operations instead, to
identify shmem inodes reliably. This will identify regular shmem inodes,
including memfds and ordinary tmpfs files, independently of wrapper file
operations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use shmem_mapping() in collapse_file() instead to not change the behavior
of collapse_file(): it operates on the page cache and uses mapping-&amp;gt;host
for shmem inode operations. Focusing on the file does not seem relevant.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/shmem: make shmem_file() check the file&amp;#39;s inode&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;shmem_file() only checks if file-&amp;gt;f_mapping is a shmem mapping. This
mapping can belong to another file, however, as with a Coda file backed
by a tmpfs container after mmap().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So it does not guarantee that the file inode is an actual shmem inode.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Seal handling and memfd preservation use this check before accessing
shmem inode state, so they can access an inode of the wrong type.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let&amp;#39;s make shmem_file() check the inode&amp;#39;s file operations instead, to
identify shmem inodes reliably. This will identify regular shmem inodes,
including memfds and ordinary tmpfs files, independently of wrapper file
operations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use shmem_mapping() in collapse_file() instead to not change the behavior
of collapse_file(): it operates on the page cache and uses mapping-&amp;gt;host
for shmem inode operations. Focusing on the file does not seem relevant.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99734</guid>
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