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      <title>CVE-2026-54426 — Apache bRPC: Stack Exhaustion via Unbounded Recursion in Redis Reply Parser</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-54426</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Apache Software Foundation Apache bRPC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Uncontrolled recursion in the Redis reply parser in Apache bRPC &amp;lt; 1.18.0 allows a remote Redis server peer to crash a bRPC Redis client process by returning a deeply nested RESP array reply. The parser recursed once for each nested array level without enforcing a depth limit. The fix adds a configurable Redis reply depth limit with default value 128 and rejects replies exceeding that limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected Scenarios:
Applications using bRPC as a Redis client with ChannelOptions.protocol=&amp;#34;redis&amp;#34; and receiving replies from an untrusted or faulty Redis server peer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;How to Fix:
1. Upgrade Apache bRPC to 1.18.0.
2. Apply the patch from PR  https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3344 .&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note:
After applying the fix, Redis replies with array nesting deeper than redis_max_reply_depth are rejected.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Apache Software Foundation Apache bRPC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Uncontrolled recursion in the Redis reply parser in Apache bRPC &amp;lt; 1.18.0 allows a remote Redis server peer to crash a bRPC Redis client process by returning a deeply nested RESP array reply. The parser recursed once for each nested array level without enforcing a depth limit. The fix adds a configurable Redis reply depth limit with default value 128 and rejects replies exceeding that limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected Scenarios:
Applications using bRPC as a Redis client with ChannelOptions.protocol=&amp;#34;redis&amp;#34; and receiving replies from an untrusted or faulty Redis server peer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;How to Fix:
1. Upgrade Apache bRPC to 1.18.0.
2. Apply the patch from PR  https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3344 .&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note:
After applying the fix, Redis replies with array nesting deeper than redis_max_reply_depth are rejected.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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