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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:18:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-99528 — SUNRPC: fix netns use-after-free in write_gssp()</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99528</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SUNRPC: fix netns use-after-free in write_gssp()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While fuzzing with a customized syzkaller, I hit a refcount warning in
xprt_alloc(), reached from a write to /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
  WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0xf8/0x120
  CPU: 0 PID: 10404 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc1-00096-gcfebfd3db73d
  Call Trace:
   &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;
   xprt_alloc+0x83f/0x9d0
   xs_setup_xprt+0xaf/0x3c0
   xs_setup_local+0x47/0x7f0
   xprt_create_transport+0x16c/0x730
   rpc_create+0x38e/0x7f0
   gssp_rpc_create+0xe2/0x180
   set_gssp_clnt+0xba/0x1b0
   write_gssp+0x200/0x310
   proc_reg_write+0x240/0x330
   vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1050
   ksys_write+0x12a/0x250
   do_syscall_64+0x117/0x750
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   &amp;lt;/TASK&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() stores the struct net pointer as the
proc entry&amp;#39;s private data without taking a reference on it, and an open
file descriptor does not pin the namespace either, as procfs only pins
the proc_dir_entry. write_gssp() reads that pointer back with
pde_data() and hands it to set_gssp_clnt(), which reaches xprt_init():&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xprt-&amp;gt;xprt_net = get_net_track(net, &amp;amp;xprt-&amp;gt;ns_tracker, GFP_KERNEL);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;get_net_track() -&amp;gt; get_net() -&amp;gt; refcount_inc() is unconditional, so
rpc_create() assumes its caller holds a reference on args.net.
write_gssp() does not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dropping the last ns.count reference does not make the file…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SUNRPC: fix netns use-after-free in write_gssp()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While fuzzing with a customized syzkaller, I hit a refcount warning in
xprt_alloc(), reached from a write to /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
  WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0xf8/0x120
  CPU: 0 PID: 10404 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc1-00096-gcfebfd3db73d
  Call Trace:
   &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;
   xprt_alloc+0x83f/0x9d0
   xs_setup_xprt+0xaf/0x3c0
   xs_setup_local+0x47/0x7f0
   xprt_create_transport+0x16c/0x730
   rpc_create+0x38e/0x7f0
   gssp_rpc_create+0xe2/0x180
   set_gssp_clnt+0xba/0x1b0
   write_gssp+0x200/0x310
   proc_reg_write+0x240/0x330
   vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1050
   ksys_write+0x12a/0x250
   do_syscall_64+0x117/0x750
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   &amp;lt;/TASK&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() stores the struct net pointer as the
proc entry&amp;#39;s private data without taking a reference on it, and an open
file descriptor does not pin the namespace either, as procfs only pins
the proc_dir_entry. write_gssp() reads that pointer back with
pde_data() and hands it to set_gssp_clnt(), which reaches xprt_init():&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xprt-&amp;gt;xprt_net = get_net_track(net, &amp;amp;xprt-&amp;gt;ns_tracker, GFP_KERNEL);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;get_net_track() -&amp;gt; get_net() -&amp;gt; refcount_inc() is unconditional, so
rpc_create() assumes its caller holds a reference on args.net.
write_gssp() does not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dropping the last ns.count reference does not make the file…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99528</guid>
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