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      <title>CVE-2026-102895 — GPUStack: Authentication bypass via trusted loopback source (reverse-proxy TCP peer or X-GPUStack-Real-IP header) grant…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-102895</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; gpustack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GPUStack is an open-source GPU cluster manager for AI model serving and GPU instance provisioning. Prior to 2.2.0, get_current_user in gpustack/api/auth.py treated a loopback request source as the built-in administrator when force_auth_localhost was false, which was the default. A remote request could appear to originate from 127.0.0.1 because client_ip_getter accepted a same-host reverse proxy peer or a client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP loopback value. The bypass allowed unauthenticated administrative access, including user and model changes, persistent administrator API-key creation, disclosure of worker and cloud-provider secrets, and code execution through POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml. Exploitation was observed in the wild against a 2.1.1 deployment. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; gpustack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GPUStack is an open-source GPU cluster manager for AI model serving and GPU instance provisioning. Prior to 2.2.0, get_current_user in gpustack/api/auth.py treated a loopback request source as the built-in administrator when force_auth_localhost was false, which was the default. A remote request could appear to originate from 127.0.0.1 because client_ip_getter accepted a same-host reverse proxy peer or a client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP loopback value. The bypass allowed unauthenticated administrative access, including user and model changes, persistent administrator API-key creation, disclosure of worker and cloud-provider secrets, and code execution through POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml. Exploitation was observed in the wild against a 2.1.1 deployment. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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