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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 23:56:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-100721 — vm2 before 3.12.2 Authorization Bypass via Custom Resolver</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-100721</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; patriksimek vm2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vm2 before 3.12.2 contains an authorization bypass in the NodeVM external-module resolver. When an embedder configures `require.external` with a custom resolver (and `context: &amp;#39;host&amp;#39;`), `LegacyResolver.customResolve` in lib/resolver-compat.js records the resolved module directory in `this.externals` as `new RegExp(&amp;#39;^&amp;#39; + escapeRegExp(resolvedPath))`, without requiring a path separator or end-of-string boundary. Untrusted guest code can therefore require the allowlisted module (e.g. `foo`) and then require the absolute path of a non-allowlisted sibling whose path merely shares the resolved prefix (e.g. `.../node_modules/foo2/index.js`); the sibling passes `isPathAllowedForModule` and is loaded through `hostRequire`, so its top-level code runs in the host process before the exports are wrapped with `vm.readonly`, resulting in a sandbox escape and arbitrary code execution in the host context.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; patriksimek vm2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vm2 before 3.12.2 contains an authorization bypass in the NodeVM external-module resolver. When an embedder configures `require.external` with a custom resolver (and `context: &amp;#39;host&amp;#39;`), `LegacyResolver.customResolve` in lib/resolver-compat.js records the resolved module directory in `this.externals` as `new RegExp(&amp;#39;^&amp;#39; + escapeRegExp(resolvedPath))`, without requiring a path separator or end-of-string boundary. Untrusted guest code can therefore require the allowlisted module (e.g. `foo`) and then require the absolute path of a non-allowlisted sibling whose path merely shares the resolved prefix (e.g. `.../node_modules/foo2/index.js`); the sibling passes `isPathAllowedForModule` and is loaded through `hostRequire`, so its top-level code runs in the host process before the exports are wrapped with `vm.readonly`, resulting in a sandbox escape and arbitrary code execution in the host context.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-100721</guid>
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