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      <title>BREW-livereload-GHSA-c2m8-h5v5-343r — Tornado: StaticFileHandler follows symlinks outside static root (path traversal)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-livereload-ghsa-c2m8-h5v5-343r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: livereload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
StaticFileHandler allows an unauthenticated attacker to read arbitrary files from the server&amp;#39;s filesystem by requesting a path that resolves to a symbolic link placed inside the static root directory. Any application that serves user-uploadable content, or whose static directory is populated by a build/deploy pipeline that creates symlinks (e.g. npm link, webpack, Docker volume mounts, CDN sync tools), is affected. An attacker who can trigger the creation of a symlink pointing outside the static root—or exploit one that already exists—can retrieve sensitive files such as /etc/passwd, private keys, configuration files, or application secrets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The vulnerability is in tornado.web.StaticFileHandler, specifically in the interaction between two methods in [tornado/web.py](vscode-webview://1grdaaa6v64itrol06qu70pq3d1b9h9im5c3npvvc9snaprc1q9f/tornado/web.py):
- [get_absolute_path](https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/blob/0ca3c5f8279d402b245718d16522bc18a8f5d958/tornado/web.py#L2932) uses `os.path.abspath()` to resolve the requested path:
- [validate_absolute_path](https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/blob/0ca3c5f8279d402b245718d16522bc18a8f5d958/tornado/web.py#L2935) uses the same `os.path.abspath()` on the root, then performs a string prefix check:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`os.path.abspath()` normalises . and .. segments but does not resolve symbolic links. As a result, a path like `/var/www/static/link` passes the `startswith(&amp;#34;/var/www/static/&amp;#34;)` check regardless of where `l…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: livereload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
StaticFileHandler allows an unauthenticated attacker to read arbitrary files from the server&amp;#39;s filesystem by requesting a path that resolves to a symbolic link placed inside the static root directory. Any application that serves user-uploadable content, or whose static directory is populated by a build/deploy pipeline that creates symlinks (e.g. npm link, webpack, Docker volume mounts, CDN sync tools), is affected. An attacker who can trigger the creation of a symlink pointing outside the static root—or exploit one that already exists—can retrieve sensitive files such as /etc/passwd, private keys, configuration files, or application secrets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The vulnerability is in tornado.web.StaticFileHandler, specifically in the interaction between two methods in [tornado/web.py](vscode-webview://1grdaaa6v64itrol06qu70pq3d1b9h9im5c3npvvc9snaprc1q9f/tornado/web.py):
- [get_absolute_path](https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/blob/0ca3c5f8279d402b245718d16522bc18a8f5d958/tornado/web.py#L2932) uses `os.path.abspath()` to resolve the requested path:
- [validate_absolute_path](https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/blob/0ca3c5f8279d402b245718d16522bc18a8f5d958/tornado/web.py#L2935) uses the same `os.path.abspath()` on the root, then performs a string prefix check:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`os.path.abspath()` normalises . and .. segments but does not resolve symbolic links. As a result, a path like `/var/www/static/link` passes the `startswith(&amp;#34;/var/www/static/&amp;#34;)` check regardless of where `l…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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