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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 05:00:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-113431 — Unbounded decoded HTTP/2 header-list size in cowlib cow_http2_machine enables HPACK amplification memory exhaustion</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-113431</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ninenines cowlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ninenines cowlib allows an unauthenticated remote peer to exhaust the memory of an HTTP/2 endpoint via HPACK-indexed header fields.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cow_http2_machine:headers_decode/4 in src/cow_http2_machine.erl decodes every HEADERS block with cow_hpack:decode/3. It bounds the compressed block size and the number of fields, but not the size of the decoded header list that RFC 9113 section 6.5.2 places under SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE. A peer stores one header value of up to the dynamic table size (4096 bytes by default) and then references it with one-byte indexed fields, so about 100 bytes on the wire decode to a header list of about 390 KB. A consumer that copies the decoded values, as Cowboy does when cowboy_http2:headers_to_map/2 joins repeated cookie fields into one binary, allocates that amount for every stream. The total across streams and connections is not bounded.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects cowlib: from 2.7.0 onward.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ninenines cowlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ninenines cowlib allows an unauthenticated remote peer to exhaust the memory of an HTTP/2 endpoint via HPACK-indexed header fields.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cow_http2_machine:headers_decode/4 in src/cow_http2_machine.erl decodes every HEADERS block with cow_hpack:decode/3. It bounds the compressed block size and the number of fields, but not the size of the decoded header list that RFC 9113 section 6.5.2 places under SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE. A peer stores one header value of up to the dynamic table size (4096 bytes by default) and then references it with one-byte indexed fields, so about 100 bytes on the wire decode to a header list of about 390 KB. A consumer that copies the decoded values, as Cowboy does when cowboy_http2:headers_to_map/2 joins repeated cookie fields into one binary, allocates that amount for every stream. The total across streams and connections is not bounded.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects cowlib: from 2.7.0 onward.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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