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      <title>CVE-2026-18053 — MemberDash &lt;= 1.8.7 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Privilege Escalation to Administrator via Edit Profile 'id' Parameter</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-18053</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; LearnDash MemberDash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MemberDash plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.8.7. This is due to a mass-assignment vulnerability in the `user_account_manager()` function&amp;#39;s edit_profile branch, where all submitted `$_POST` fields are iterated and directly assigned to the current member object via the `MS_Model` `__set()` magic method with no field allowlist and no capability or ownership check on the submitted `id` parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to inject an arbitrary user ID via the `id` parameter — overwriting any WordPress user&amp;#39;s email address and password, including the site administrator&amp;#39;s — and subsequently use those modified credentials to gain full administrative access to the site.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; LearnDash MemberDash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MemberDash plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.8.7. This is due to a mass-assignment vulnerability in the `user_account_manager()` function&amp;#39;s edit_profile branch, where all submitted `$_POST` fields are iterated and directly assigned to the current member object via the `MS_Model` `__set()` magic method with no field allowlist and no capability or ownership check on the submitted `id` parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to inject an arbitrary user ID via the `id` parameter — overwriting any WordPress user&amp;#39;s email address and password, including the site administrator&amp;#39;s — and subsequently use those modified credentials to gain full administrative access to the site.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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