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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 23:56:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-100683 — Budibase before 3.45.0 SQL Injection via column-rename DDL</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-100683</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; budibase server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Budibase (@budibase/server) before 3.45.0 builds MySQL and MSSQL column-rename DDL in packages/backend-core/src/sql/sqlTable.ts by interpolating identifiers directly into a raw query string (backtick-quoted for MySQL, a single-quoted sp_rename literal for MSSQL) without applying the project&amp;#39;s quoteMySqlIdentifier / quoteSqlServerIdentifier helpers. An attacker with DDL rights on a connected MySQL/MSSQL datasource can create a column whose name contains a backtick (MySQL) or single quote (MSSQL) plus additional SQL; Budibase&amp;#39;s schema introspection stores the name verbatim, and when a Budibase builder later renames that column through the UI (POST /api/tables with _rename.old), the embedded quote character terminates the identifier and the injected SQL is executed. Because the MySQL connection is opened with multipleStatements: true, stacked statements run as Budibase&amp;#39;s datasource user, allowing arbitrary reads, writes, or destructive operations on the connected database outside Budibase&amp;#39;s row/table permission model. Fixed in 3.45.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; budibase server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Budibase (@budibase/server) before 3.45.0 builds MySQL and MSSQL column-rename DDL in packages/backend-core/src/sql/sqlTable.ts by interpolating identifiers directly into a raw query string (backtick-quoted for MySQL, a single-quoted sp_rename literal for MSSQL) without applying the project&amp;#39;s quoteMySqlIdentifier / quoteSqlServerIdentifier helpers. An attacker with DDL rights on a connected MySQL/MSSQL datasource can create a column whose name contains a backtick (MySQL) or single quote (MSSQL) plus additional SQL; Budibase&amp;#39;s schema introspection stores the name verbatim, and when a Budibase builder later renames that column through the UI (POST /api/tables with _rename.old), the embedded quote character terminates the identifier and the injected SQL is executed. Because the MySQL connection is opened with multipleStatements: true, stacked statements run as Budibase&amp;#39;s datasource user, allowing arbitrary reads, writes, or destructive operations on the connected database outside Budibase&amp;#39;s row/table permission model. Fixed in 3.45.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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