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      <title>CVE-2026-115700 — SSRF allowlist bypass via percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 or trailing-dot IP literal in hackney</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-115700</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; benoitc hackney&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in hackney_url in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as %5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D (decoding to [::ffff:127.0.0.1]) or 127.0.0.1. is not an IP address to a caller&amp;#39;s allowlist built on uri_string:parse/1 and inet:parse_address/1, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a Location target when redirects are followed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The IP-literal gate that hackney_url:normalize/2 applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to inet_parse:address/1 as is. The connect path in hackney_happy:parse_address/1 drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; benoitc hackney&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in hackney_url in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as %5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D (decoding to [::ffff:127.0.0.1]) or 127.0.0.1. is not an IP address to a caller&amp;#39;s allowlist built on uri_string:parse/1 and inet:parse_address/1, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a Location target when redirects are followed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The IP-literal gate that hackney_url:normalize/2 applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to inet_parse:address/1 as is. The connect path in hackney_happy:parse_address/1 drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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