https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 23 Oct 2026 19:30:20 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-ggshield-ghsa-77hh-43cm-v8j6 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: ggshield</p> <p>The security of both a TUF client and repository implementations depend on the concept of trusted Metadata objects verifying the signatures over other Metadata that it delegates to. This verification process uses `Targets.get_delegated_role(delegated_role: str)` to find the delegation information.</p> <p>`tuf.api.metadata.Targets.get_delegated_role()` should ensure that the given `delegated_rolename` is actually a name of a role that is delegated by that Targets, but in the case of &#34;succinct delegation&#34; this does not happen.</p> <p>`tuf.ngclient` users are **not** impacted but direct users of `tuf.api.metadata` could be impacted.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>If an attacker can make a Metadata API user run `Targets.get_delegated_role()` so that 1. the `Targets` uses succinct delegation 1. the `delegated_role` argument is not actually delegated by the `Targets`</p> <p>the result will be incorrect.</p> <p>This also means that if an attacker can make a Metadata API user run `Targets.verify_delegate()` or `Targets.get_verification_result()` so that 1. the delegating `Targets` uses a succinct delegation 1. the `delegated_role` argument is the name of some unrelated Metadata 1. that other Metadata is correctly signed by the keys defined in the succinct delegation</p> <p>the result would be a successful verification even though the `Targets` in question does not actually delegate to `delegated_role`.</p> <p>The impact is estimated to be low for following reasons:</p> <p>* This cannot impact a TUF client that implements the client workflow…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: ggshield</p> <p>The security of both a TUF client and repository implementations depend on the concept of trusted Metadata objects verifying the signatures over other Metadata that it delegates to. This verification process uses `Targets.get_delegated_role(delegated_role: str)` to find the delegation information.</p> <p>`tuf.api.metadata.Targets.get_delegated_role()` should ensure that the given `delegated_rolename` is actually a name of a role that is delegated by that Targets, but in the case of &#34;succinct delegation&#34; this does not happen.</p> <p>`tuf.ngclient` users are **not** impacted but direct users of `tuf.api.metadata` could be impacted.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>If an attacker can make a Metadata API user run `Targets.get_delegated_role()` so that 1. the `Targets` uses succinct delegation 1. the `delegated_role` argument is not actually delegated by the `Targets`</p> <p>the result will be incorrect.</p> <p>This also means that if an attacker can make a Metadata API user run `Targets.verify_delegate()` or `Targets.get_verification_result()` so that 1. the delegating `Targets` uses a succinct delegation 1. the `delegated_role` argument is the name of some unrelated Metadata 1. that other Metadata is correctly signed by the keys defined in the succinct delegation</p> <p>the result would be a successful verification even though the `Targets` in question does not actually delegate to `delegated_role`.</p> <p>The impact is estimated to be low for following reasons:</p> <p>* This cannot impact a TUF client that implements the client workflow…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-ggshield-ghsa-77hh-43cm-v8j6