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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:15:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-99357 — SUNRPC: Copy the deferred RPC Call from the head buffer</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99357</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SUNRPC: Copy the deferred RPC Call from the head buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;svc_defer() snapshots the RPC Call for replay once a pending cache
upcall resolves. It copies the Call starting (rq_arg.len -
head[0].iov_len) bytes before head[0].iov_base, a back-up that once
covered a transport header. No transport has had one since commit
983084b2672c (&amp;#34;SUNRPC: Remove svc_rqst::rq_xprt_hlen&amp;#34;), so the two
lengths are meant to be equal.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An RPCSEC_GSS Call breaks that assumption. Unwrapping the integrity
service truncates rq_arg.len by the length of the trailing checksum,
and unwrapping the privacy service leaves rq_arg.len short by an
amount the client sets with trailing bytes after the wrap token.
Neither adjusts head[0].iov_len. Both lengths are size_t, so the
subtraction underflows and the copy starts past head[0].iov_base.
Every deferred integrity Call replays a shifted snapshot.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A deferred replay skips GSS verification, so a shifted snapshot runs
as an authenticated Call. With the privacy service the offset is
client-chosen. A forged Call placed in that window, naming another
user&amp;#39;s GSS context handle, runs under that identity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Copy the Call from head[0].iov_base. Refuse to defer a Call whose
length runs past the head buffer, so the copy cannot read out of
bounds.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SUNRPC: Copy the deferred RPC Call from the head buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;svc_defer() snapshots the RPC Call for replay once a pending cache
upcall resolves. It copies the Call starting (rq_arg.len -
head[0].iov_len) bytes before head[0].iov_base, a back-up that once
covered a transport header. No transport has had one since commit
983084b2672c (&amp;#34;SUNRPC: Remove svc_rqst::rq_xprt_hlen&amp;#34;), so the two
lengths are meant to be equal.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An RPCSEC_GSS Call breaks that assumption. Unwrapping the integrity
service truncates rq_arg.len by the length of the trailing checksum,
and unwrapping the privacy service leaves rq_arg.len short by an
amount the client sets with trailing bytes after the wrap token.
Neither adjusts head[0].iov_len. Both lengths are size_t, so the
subtraction underflows and the copy starts past head[0].iov_base.
Every deferred integrity Call replays a shifted snapshot.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A deferred replay skips GSS verification, so a shifted snapshot runs
as an authenticated Call. With the privacy service the offset is
client-chosen. A forged Call placed in that window, naming another
user&amp;#39;s GSS context handle, runs under that identity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Copy the Call from head[0].iov_base. Refuse to defer a Call whose
length runs past the head buffer, so the copy cannot read out of
bounds.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99357</guid>
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