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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 09:10:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-112880 — CRLF injection in Proxy-Authorization header built from proxy_auth_fun in hackney</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-112880</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; benoitc hackney&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers (&amp;#39;HTTP Request/Response Splitting&amp;#39;) vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller&amp;#39;s proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy&amp;#39;s challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; benoitc hackney&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers (&amp;#39;HTTP Request/Response Splitting&amp;#39;) vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller&amp;#39;s proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy&amp;#39;s challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-112880</guid>
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