<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 17:15:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-81868 — Steeltoe: Header-forwarded client cert lacks proof of private-key possession</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-81868</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; SteeltoeOSS security-advisories&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. Prior to 4.3.0, Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate deployments using AddOrgAndSpacePolicies() and UseCertificateAuthorization() trust the public certificate supplied in the X-Client-Cert request header without proving possession of the corresponding private key. Common Cloud Foundry routers do not remove this header from inbound requests. When inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP, an attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space and can reach the application can spoof X-Client-Cert to bypass the SameOrg and SameSpace policies for the certificate validity period. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; SteeltoeOSS security-advisories&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. Prior to 4.3.0, Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate deployments using AddOrgAndSpacePolicies() and UseCertificateAuthorization() trust the public certificate supplied in the X-Client-Cert request header without proving possession of the corresponding private key. Common Cloud Foundry routers do not remove this header from inbound requests. When inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP, an attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space and can reach the application can spoof X-Client-Cert to bypass the SameOrg and SameSpace policies for the certificate validity period. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-81868</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
