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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 07:04:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-98104 — net/sched: cls_u32: fix duplicate handle when node ID pool is exhausted</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98104</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: cls_u32: fix duplicate handle when node ID pool is exhausted&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;gen_new_kid() falls back to returning max (htid | 0xFFF) when both
idr_alloc_u32() ranges are full, instead of reporting an error.
u32_change() trusts that value and inserts a new knode with a handle
that is already live in the hash table, breaking handle uniqueness
within the table&amp;#39;s node ID space.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The handle was never reserved in ht-&amp;gt;handle_idr, so every later error
path that does idr_remove(&amp;amp;ht-&amp;gt;handle_idr, handle) removes the
reservation of a different, live knode, which is then reused — one
failed add compounds into further duplicates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The 4095 limit is per (table, bucket) — ht-&amp;gt;handle_idr is per hash
table and the range is derived from htid (bucketid), so a table with
divisor 256 can legitimately hold 256*4095 knodes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The sibling helper gen_new_htid() has the same silent in-band failure:
it returns 0 when the tp_c handle pool (1..0x7FF) is full, and
u32_init() publishes the root hash table with handle 0 without
checking.  Two root tables with handle 0 alias in u32_lookup_ht(),
allowing cross-tcf_proto knode add/lookup/delete.  Add the same
exhaustion check that the divisor path already has.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Return an error so u32_change() fails with ENOSPC/ENOMEM when the
node ID space is exhausted, and so u32_init() fails with -ENOMEM
when the hash table ID space is exhausted.  The extack message
distinguishes pool exhaustion (-ENOSPC) from…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: cls_u32: fix duplicate handle when node ID pool is exhausted&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;gen_new_kid() falls back to returning max (htid | 0xFFF) when both
idr_alloc_u32() ranges are full, instead of reporting an error.
u32_change() trusts that value and inserts a new knode with a handle
that is already live in the hash table, breaking handle uniqueness
within the table&amp;#39;s node ID space.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The handle was never reserved in ht-&amp;gt;handle_idr, so every later error
path that does idr_remove(&amp;amp;ht-&amp;gt;handle_idr, handle) removes the
reservation of a different, live knode, which is then reused — one
failed add compounds into further duplicates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The 4095 limit is per (table, bucket) — ht-&amp;gt;handle_idr is per hash
table and the range is derived from htid (bucketid), so a table with
divisor 256 can legitimately hold 256*4095 knodes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The sibling helper gen_new_htid() has the same silent in-band failure:
it returns 0 when the tp_c handle pool (1..0x7FF) is full, and
u32_init() publishes the root hash table with handle 0 without
checking.  Two root tables with handle 0 alias in u32_lookup_ht(),
allowing cross-tcf_proto knode add/lookup/delete.  Add the same
exhaustion check that the divisor path already has.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Return an error so u32_change() fails with ENOSPC/ENOMEM when the
node ID space is exhausted, and so u32_init() fails with -ENOMEM
when the hash table ID space is exhausted.  The extack message
distinguishes pool exhaustion (-ENOSPC) from…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98104</guid>
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