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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-61437 — PraisonAI before 1.6.78 Remote Code Execution via tools.py</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-61437</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI (pip package praisonaiagents) before 1.6.78 contains an unsafe dynamic module loading vulnerability in AgentFlow._resolve_pydantic_class (src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/workflows.py). When a workflow step uses a string output_pydantic reference, the framework locates and imports a sibling tools.py from the workflow file&amp;#39;s directory via importlib exec_module without sandboxing, ignoring the PRAISONAI_ALLOW_*_TOOLS environment variables. An attacker who controls a workflow file and its sibling tools.py can execute arbitrary Python code with the workflow runner&amp;#39;s privileges when the workflow is executed via WorkflowManager or after load_yaml.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI (pip package praisonaiagents) before 1.6.78 contains an unsafe dynamic module loading vulnerability in AgentFlow._resolve_pydantic_class (src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/workflows.py). When a workflow step uses a string output_pydantic reference, the framework locates and imports a sibling tools.py from the workflow file&amp;#39;s directory via importlib exec_module without sandboxing, ignoring the PRAISONAI_ALLOW_*_TOOLS environment variables. An attacker who controls a workflow file and its sibling tools.py can execute arbitrary Python code with the workflow runner&amp;#39;s privileges when the workflow is executed via WorkflowManager or after load_yaml.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-61437</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-4267 — PraisonAI: Unsafe Dynamic Module Loading Leads to Arbitrary Code Execution via tools.py in AgentFlow</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4267</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
An unsafe dynamic module loading vulnerability allows an attacker who can control a workflow file and a sibling `tools.py` to execute arbitrary Python code when the workflow is executed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The vulnerability is located in the workflow structured output resolution logic.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;File: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/workflows.py&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Method: AgentFlow._resolve_pydantic_class&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
if self.file_path:
    workflow_dir = Path(self.file_path).parent
    tools_path = workflow_dir / &amp;#34;tools.py&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if tools_path.exists():
        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(&amp;#34;tools&amp;#34;, tools_path)
        tools_module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
        spec.loader.exec_module(tools_module)   # Arbitrary code execution
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This code is reached during step execution when a step uses a string `output_pydantic`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
step_output_pydantic = getattr(step, &amp;#39;_output_pydantic&amp;#39;, None)
if step_output_pydantic and isinstance(step_output_pydantic, str):
    resolved_class = self._resolve_pydantic_class(step_output_pydantic)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`file_path` is set automatically by:
- `WorkflowManager._load_workflow()` (used by workspace discovery)
- `WorkflowManager.create_workflow()`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It can also be set manually after `load_yaml()`:
```python
wf = mgr.load_yaml(&amp;#34;workflow.yaml&amp;#34;)
wf.file_path = &amp;#34;workflow.yaml&amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `exec_module()` call has no sandboxing and ignores the `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_*_TOOLS` environment variables used elsewhere in the project.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Cre…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
An unsafe dynamic module loading vulnerability allows an attacker who can control a workflow file and a sibling `tools.py` to execute arbitrary Python code when the workflow is executed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The vulnerability is located in the workflow structured output resolution logic.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;File: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/workflows.py&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Method: AgentFlow._resolve_pydantic_class&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
if self.file_path:
    workflow_dir = Path(self.file_path).parent
    tools_path = workflow_dir / &amp;#34;tools.py&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if tools_path.exists():
        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(&amp;#34;tools&amp;#34;, tools_path)
        tools_module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
        spec.loader.exec_module(tools_module)   # Arbitrary code execution
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This code is reached during step execution when a step uses a string `output_pydantic`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
step_output_pydantic = getattr(step, &amp;#39;_output_pydantic&amp;#39;, None)
if step_output_pydantic and isinstance(step_output_pydantic, str):
    resolved_class = self._resolve_pydantic_class(step_output_pydantic)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`file_path` is set automatically by:
- `WorkflowManager._load_workflow()` (used by workspace discovery)
- `WorkflowManager.create_workflow()`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It can also be set manually after `load_yaml()`:
```python
wf = mgr.load_yaml(&amp;#34;workflow.yaml&amp;#34;)
wf.file_path = &amp;#34;workflow.yaml&amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `exec_module()` call has no sandboxing and ignores the `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_*_TOOLS` environment variables used elsewhere in the project.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Cre…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4267</guid>
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