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      <title>CVE-2026-93471 — Unbounded SAML message decompression in esaml allows memory exhaustion</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-93471</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; handnot2 esaml, arekinath esaml, dropbox esaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) in esaml_binding in dropbox esaml allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust server memory and crash the Erlang VM via a crafted compressed SAMLResponse.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;esaml_binding:decode_response/2 base64-decodes the attacker-supplied SAMLResponse, inflates it with zlib:unzip/1 with no bound on the output, then converts the result to a charlist with binary_to_list/1 before parsing. This runs on the SAML consume (ACS) and single-logout endpoints, which accept unauthenticated requests by design, and it runs before any signature check. A small deflate stream reaches a compression ratio near 1000 to 1, so a request body of tens of kilobytes inflates to hundreds of megabytes and then to several gigabytes of list heap, so a few requests exhaust memory and take the node down.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects esaml: from 0.1.0 onward.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; handnot2 esaml, arekinath esaml, dropbox esaml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) in esaml_binding in dropbox esaml allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust server memory and crash the Erlang VM via a crafted compressed SAMLResponse.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;esaml_binding:decode_response/2 base64-decodes the attacker-supplied SAMLResponse, inflates it with zlib:unzip/1 with no bound on the output, then converts the result to a charlist with binary_to_list/1 before parsing. This runs on the SAML consume (ACS) and single-logout endpoints, which accept unauthenticated requests by design, and it runs before any signature check. A small deflate stream reaches a compression ratio near 1000 to 1, so a request body of tens of kilobytes inflates to hundreds of megabytes and then to several gigabytes of list heap, so a few requests exhaust memory and take the node down.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects esaml: from 0.1.0 onward.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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