<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 10:29:11 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-65197 — H3C G3/G5 HDM Firmware Verification Key Replacement</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-65197</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; H3C HDM Family-A G5&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;H3C HDM Family-A verifies the RSA signature of a firmware image against a public key it reads from the mutable file `/conf/public.pem`. That file is writable by an authenticated Redfish client through the `UpdateService.UploadSignKey` action, which stores the uploaded body verbatim after validating only that the multipart filename ends in `.pem`. An administrator, or any account with `firmware-update` privilege, can therefore replace the trust anchor with their own key, sign a malicious image with the matching private key, and have it pass verification. Family-A has no hardware root-of-trust (no PFR) to catch the substituted key.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This was observed on H3C HDM Family-A G5 HDM 6.14.01. H3C HDM Family-A G3/G5 builds carrying the Redfish/DRE update tree appear to be affected. HDM2 uses a different update path and is not covered by this finding.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; H3C HDM Family-A G5&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;H3C HDM Family-A verifies the RSA signature of a firmware image against a public key it reads from the mutable file `/conf/public.pem`. That file is writable by an authenticated Redfish client through the `UpdateService.UploadSignKey` action, which stores the uploaded body verbatim after validating only that the multipart filename ends in `.pem`. An administrator, or any account with `firmware-update` privilege, can therefore replace the trust anchor with their own key, sign a malicious image with the matching private key, and have it pass verification. Family-A has no hardware root-of-trust (no PFR) to catch the substituted key.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This was observed on H3C HDM Family-A G5 HDM 6.14.01. H3C HDM Family-A G3/G5 builds carrying the Redfish/DRE update tree appear to be affected. HDM2 uses a different update path and is not covered by this finding.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-65197</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
