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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 22:58:11 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-133190 — MISP CryptographicKey: Revoked PGP Keys Still Validate Protected Event Signatures and Key Revocation Sync Is Ineffective</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-133190</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; misp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MISP, a threat intelligence sharing platform, contains a vulnerability in its cryptographic key management for protected (PGP-signed) events. Two related defects allow a revoked PGP key to remain effective for signing and validating protected events.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;First, the validateProtectedEvent() method in the CryptographicKey model iterates over the event&amp;#39;s stored cryptographic keys to verify a PGP signature but does not check the revoked flag on each key. A key explicitly marked as revoked is still used to validate signatures, meaning an entity whose key has been revoked can continue to sign protected events and have them accepted by the MISP instance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Second, the captureCryptographicKeyUpdate() method, responsible for synchronizing the key list when a sync user edits a protected event, contained a query bug (find(&amp;#39;first&amp;#39;) instead of find(&amp;#39;all&amp;#39;)) that caused only the first stored key to be considered. As a result, revocations of additional keys were never persisted, keys absent from the pushed list were not removed, and entries lacking an explicit fingerprint were mismatched and incorrectly deleted. Additionally, the revocation logic did not enforce the invariant that a revocation, once stored, is never lifted by subsequent pushes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A third minor issue: a signed protected event submitted without any cryptographic keys triggered an unhandled 500 error rather than a proper rejection response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Preconditions: the attacker must be an authenticated sync user with permission to add or ed…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; misp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MISP, a threat intelligence sharing platform, contains a vulnerability in its cryptographic key management for protected (PGP-signed) events. Two related defects allow a revoked PGP key to remain effective for signing and validating protected events.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;First, the validateProtectedEvent() method in the CryptographicKey model iterates over the event&amp;#39;s stored cryptographic keys to verify a PGP signature but does not check the revoked flag on each key. A key explicitly marked as revoked is still used to validate signatures, meaning an entity whose key has been revoked can continue to sign protected events and have them accepted by the MISP instance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Second, the captureCryptographicKeyUpdate() method, responsible for synchronizing the key list when a sync user edits a protected event, contained a query bug (find(&amp;#39;first&amp;#39;) instead of find(&amp;#39;all&amp;#39;)) that caused only the first stored key to be considered. As a result, revocations of additional keys were never persisted, keys absent from the pushed list were not removed, and entries lacking an explicit fingerprint were mismatched and incorrectly deleted. Additionally, the revocation logic did not enforce the invariant that a revocation, once stored, is never lifted by subsequent pushes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A third minor issue: a signed protected event submitted without any cryptographic keys triggered an unhandled 500 error rather than a proper rejection response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Preconditions: the attacker must be an authenticated sync user with permission to add or ed…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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