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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 12:24:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-95701 — MISP Path Traversal via Organization Name in Org-Statistics Logo Check</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-95701</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MISP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In MISP, the __statisticsOrgs method in UsersController.php used the organization name directly as a file-system path component when checking for the existence of an organization logo image. The original code called file_exists() with a path constructed as APP . &amp;#39;webroot&amp;#39; . DS . &amp;#39;img&amp;#39; . DS . &amp;#39;orgs&amp;#39; . DS . $k . &amp;#39;.png&amp;#39;, where $k is the organization name. Because the referenced directory (app/webroot/img/orgs) no longer exists in current MISP deployments (org logos were relocated to files/img/orgs), the check was functionally dead and never triggered. However, the underlying pattern—concatenating an attacker-influenced organization name into a file path without sanitization—constitutes a path traversal weakness. An organization name containing directory traversal sequences (e.g., &amp;#39;../../../../etc/passwd&amp;#39;) would, if the target directory existed, allow an authenticated user with the ability to create or rename an organization to probe for the existence of arbitrary files on the server.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MISP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In MISP, the __statisticsOrgs method in UsersController.php used the organization name directly as a file-system path component when checking for the existence of an organization logo image. The original code called file_exists() with a path constructed as APP . &amp;#39;webroot&amp;#39; . DS . &amp;#39;img&amp;#39; . DS . &amp;#39;orgs&amp;#39; . DS . $k . &amp;#39;.png&amp;#39;, where $k is the organization name. Because the referenced directory (app/webroot/img/orgs) no longer exists in current MISP deployments (org logos were relocated to files/img/orgs), the check was functionally dead and never triggered. However, the underlying pattern—concatenating an attacker-influenced organization name into a file path without sanitization—constitutes a path traversal weakness. An organization name containing directory traversal sequences (e.g., &amp;#39;../../../../etc/passwd&amp;#39;) would, if the target directory existed, allow an authenticated user with the ability to create or rename an organization to probe for the existence of arbitrary files on the server.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-95701</guid>
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