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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 20:53:08 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-99795 — cxl/features: Ensure that count is set before access to ent[] __counted_by()</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99795</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cxl/features: Ensure that count is set before access to ent[] __counted_by()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;get_supported_features() assigns entries-&amp;gt;num_features only after the
memcpy() loop that fills entries-&amp;gt;ent[] has already run. Since ent[]
is __counted_by(num_features), the compiler&amp;#39;s bounds instrumentation
sees a 0-length array during that loop and FORTIFY_SOURCE trips on
the memcpy. Set @num_features right after allocation, before any
write into ent[], so the bound is correct for the whole lifetime of
the array.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This was found via a fortify panic:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 384 byte write of buffer size 0
 WARNING: lib/string_helpers.c:1035 at __fortify_report+0x54/0xa0
 kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1043!
 Call trace:
  __fortify_panic+0x10/0x18
  get_supported_features.isra.0+0x4a0/0x4d0 [cxl_core]
  devm_cxl_setup_features+0x84/0x120 [cxl_core]
  cxl_pci_probe+0x254/0x5e0 [cxl_pci]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Same class of bug, same fix shape as commit 6c9d2e87df40
(&amp;#34;cxl/fwctl: Fix __fortify_panic&amp;#34;), which fixed the analogous issue
in cxlctl_get_supported_features() but missed this one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[ dj: Fixed up title typo per Jonathan. ]&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cxl/features: Ensure that count is set before access to ent[] __counted_by()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;get_supported_features() assigns entries-&amp;gt;num_features only after the
memcpy() loop that fills entries-&amp;gt;ent[] has already run. Since ent[]
is __counted_by(num_features), the compiler&amp;#39;s bounds instrumentation
sees a 0-length array during that loop and FORTIFY_SOURCE trips on
the memcpy. Set @num_features right after allocation, before any
write into ent[], so the bound is correct for the whole lifetime of
the array.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This was found via a fortify panic:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 384 byte write of buffer size 0
 WARNING: lib/string_helpers.c:1035 at __fortify_report+0x54/0xa0
 kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1043!
 Call trace:
  __fortify_panic+0x10/0x18
  get_supported_features.isra.0+0x4a0/0x4d0 [cxl_core]
  devm_cxl_setup_features+0x84/0x120 [cxl_core]
  cxl_pci_probe+0x254/0x5e0 [cxl_pci]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Same class of bug, same fix shape as commit 6c9d2e87df40
(&amp;#34;cxl/fwctl: Fix __fortify_panic&amp;#34;), which fixed the analogous issue
in cxlctl_get_supported_features() but missed this one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[ dj: Fixed up title typo per Jonathan. ]&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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