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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 20:53:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-99785 — 9p/trans_virtio: reject mount tags longer than NAME_MAX at probe</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99785</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;9p/trans_virtio: reject mount tags longer than NAME_MAX at probe&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;p9_virtio_probe() reads a 16-bit mount tag length (tag_len) from the
device config and kzalloc()s tag_len + 1 bytes for chan-&amp;gt;tag with no
upper bound. A malicious or compromised host can present a tag of up to
65535 bytes; that tag is later copied into the single-page sysfs buffer
by p9_mount_tag_show() (memcpy(buf, chan-&amp;gt;tag, tag_len + 1)), a
host-controlled out-of-bounds write of up to ~64 KiB past the PAGE_SIZE
attribute buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject an overlong tag at probe time. A 9p mount tag is a name-like
identifier, so bound it by NAME_MAX (255): that limit is independent of
the sysfs/seq_file page size and is far above any legitimate mount tag,
which keeps p9_mount_tag_show() safe at the root without hard-coding a
seq_file implementation detail.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;9p/trans_virtio: reject mount tags longer than NAME_MAX at probe&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;p9_virtio_probe() reads a 16-bit mount tag length (tag_len) from the
device config and kzalloc()s tag_len + 1 bytes for chan-&amp;gt;tag with no
upper bound. A malicious or compromised host can present a tag of up to
65535 bytes; that tag is later copied into the single-page sysfs buffer
by p9_mount_tag_show() (memcpy(buf, chan-&amp;gt;tag, tag_len + 1)), a
host-controlled out-of-bounds write of up to ~64 KiB past the PAGE_SIZE
attribute buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject an overlong tag at probe time. A 9p mount tag is a name-like
identifier, so bound it by NAME_MAX (255): that limit is independent of
the sysfs/seq_file page size and is far above any legitimate mount tag,
which keeps p9_mount_tag_show() safe at the root without hard-coding a
seq_file implementation detail.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99785</guid>
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